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1972년 3월에 설립된 동서문제연구원은 연세대학교 교직원으로서 다양한 지역과 학문을 융합하는 연구기관으로 자리매김해 왔습니다. 올해 설립 45주년을 맞이하여 동서연은 기술·경제·경영, 사회문화, 에너지 그리고 지역을 주제로 네 차례의 포럼을 기획하고 있습니다.

오는 11월 25일에 개최하는 동서연 개원 45주년 4차 포럼에서는 동북아 3개국을 아우르는 주제로서 <21세기 지역학 연구의 현황과 전망: 동북아 평화와 협력의 현실과 미래>를 다루고자 합니다. 이번 포럼에서는 지역학 측면에서 한중일 3개국의 연구 및 역사적 경로를 평가하고 이를 통해 동북아 지역학의 발전과 협력 방안을 모색할 예정입니다.

관심 있으신 분들의 많은 참석 바랍니다.

감사합니다.

# 21세기 지역학연구의 현황과 전망: 동북아 평화와 협력의 현실과 미래

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발표1

# The State of Area Studies in Korea : Chinese and Japanese Studies

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# The State of Area Studies in Korea : Chinese and Japanese Studies

Yonsei University, Seoul  
고상두 교수

## I. 서론

오늘날 국제협력이 지역수준에서 강화되고 있다. 세계화의 부정적인 파급효과에 대한 우려가 커지면서, 지역주의가 부상하고 있는 것이다. 이러한 배경에서 지역연구의 중요성이 부각되고 있다. 실용적인 관점에서 보면, 지역연구 중에서도 주변국 연구는 국익에 가장 큰 도움이 되는 연구영역이다. 그러므로 한국에게는 중국연구와 일본연구가 가장 중요하다고 하겠다.

한국의 지역연구는 실용적 관점에서 출범하였다. 지역연구가 활성화된 국가적 계기는 김영삼 정부가 세계화정책을 표방한 것이다. 당시 정부는 세계화 정책에서 국제화와 지역화 두 가지를 함께 표방하였다. 초기에는 국제무대에서 활동할 수 있는 영어 구사가 가능한 전문가를 양성하겠다는 목표를 세웠다. 나중에는 세계화 시대에 해외사정에 밝은 지역전문가 양성을 목표로 세웠다. 그리하여 대학에서도 국제학과 지역학은 서로 뚜렷한 구분 없이 혼재적으로 연구하고 교육되고 있다. 이러한 점에서 지역학이 장기적으로 독자적인 영역을 구축하기 위해서는 고유한 학문적 정체성을 확립하는 것이 필요하다. 이 글은 한국의 지역연구 발전을 위한 방향을 탐색하기 위해 우선적으로 필요한 현황 점검을 하고자 한다. 특히 그 중에서도 우리에게 가장 중요한 이웃인 일본과 중국에 관한 연구 성과, 연구자, 연구기관의 실태를 파악하려는 것이다.

일본과 중국연구의 현황을 살펴보기 위해서는 몇 가지 검토기준이 필요하다. 첫째, 한국에서 일본과 중국연구가 언제부터 활성화되었는지를 검토할 것이다. 모든 학문적 연구는 부침을 겪기 마련이고, 그에 따라 단계적 변화를 하게 된다. 이 글에서는 일본과 중국연구의 변화발전을 단계별로 살펴볼 것이다. 그리하여 일본과 중국연구는 어떠한 변화와 지속성을 보이고 있는지 알아볼 것이다. 둘째, 일본과 중국연구의 변화발전을 검토하면서 연구의 장애물이 무엇인지를 찾아내고자 한다. 장애요인은 외부적 요인과 내부적 요인이 있다. 또한 인적, 물적 자원의 부족에 따른 인프라 요인도 있다. 이처럼 다원적 요인의 발생 가능성을 염두에 두고 장애요인을 발견한 후 개선책을 제안할 것이다. 일본과 중국연구에서의 장애요인은 해당지역에만 국한된다기보다 다른 지역연구에도 함께 적용될 수 있기 때문에 전체 지역연구의 발전에 주는 함의가 있다고 할 것이다. 셋째, 일본과 중국연구에서 중요하게 다루는 주제는 어떠한 것인지 파악하고자 한다. 연구주제는 학문의 정체성을 정립하는 데에 중요한 역할을 한다.

따라서 일본연구와 중국연구가 다루는 주제들의 공통점과 차이점을 비교하여 살펴봄으로써 이들 연구들이 각자 얼마나 독창적인 학문 정체성을 확보하고 있는지 알아보고, 연구관심을 받지 못하고 있는 주제영역이 있는지도 동시에 파악하고자 한다.

이러한 연구목적에 따라 이 글은 아래와 같이 구성된다. 서론에 이어서 지역연구의 개념과 정체성에 관한 논의를 전개할 것이다. 이러한 논의는 일본연구와 중국연구의 현황을 검토하는 데에 필요한 기준을 만들고 정교화하는 데에 도움이 될 것이다. 그 다음 장에서는 일본연구와 중국연구가 한국에서 어떻게 변화 발전했는지를 살펴볼 것이다. 그리하여 두 연구영역의 발전을 비교적 관점에서 검토하여 공통점과 차이점을 찾을 것이다. 그리고 다음 장에서는 일본연구와 중국연구의 현황을 검토하여 연구주제, 연구자, 연구기관, 학술저널 등의 특징을 서로 비교하며 살펴볼 것이다.

## II. 지역연구의 개념과 정체성에 관한 논의

지역학이란 특정국가에 대한 종합적 이해를 하는 학문이다. 따라서 지역연구는 주로 해외지역을 분석 대상으로 한다. 지역연구의 주된 분석대상은 국가이지만, 그것이 유일한 대상은 아니다. 지역은 국가 일수도 있고, 국가와 국가가 연합한 초국가일수도 있다. 또한 국가보다 낮은 단위인 지방도 분석대상이 될 수 있다. 정치적 영역이외에 문명권, 경제권, 생활권도 지역연구의 중요한 분석대상이 될 수 있다.<sup>1)</sup>

지역학의 생성발전 과정을 살펴보면 과거에는 지역연구가 인문학에서 이루어졌으나 점차 사회과학으로 확대되었다. 따라서 지역연구는 해당지역의 고전을 탐구하는 어문학적 연구에서 오늘날 사회과학적 분석이 가미된 현대적 의미의 지역학이 정립되었다. 이러한 이유 때문에 지역학이 다루는 주제는 언어, 문화, 종교 등의 인문학적 현상뿐만이 아니라 지리, 건축, 정치, 경제, 사회 등 사회과학적 현상이 포함되어 종합적이고 학제적인 속성을 갖게 된 것이다.

지역학의 정체성은 지역연구가 추구하는 해석적 연구방법에서 잘 드러난다. 독일의 철학자 딜타이는 “자연과학의 목적은 설명이고, 정신과학의 목적은 해석이다”라고 말했다. 해석적 방법이란 맥락을 파악하여 현상을 이해시키는 것이다. 따라서 해석적 방법에서는 편견과 선입관도 중요한 설명변수가 될 수 있다. 지역연구의 우선적 과제는 특정한 사회에 접근하기 전에 그 사회의 맥락을 이해하는 것이다. 그런데 과학적 방법의 장점은 객관성과 일반성에 있다. 숫자는 진술보다 정확하며, 대량의 표본연구는 개별 사례연구보다 일반화의 가능성을 높여준다. 그러나 변수를 독립적 존재로 다루게 되면 필연적으로 자신이 구성하고 있는 사회적 의미체계에서 떨어져 나오게 된다. 맥락에서 잘려 나온 개별변수는 환경과의 연계를 상실한 박제와 같다. 이것이 사회과학을 현실세계와 멀어지게 만들었다.<sup>2)</sup>

1) 이중희, “지역연구의 대상과 방법,” 『국제지역연구』 제5권 3호, 2001, p. 5.

2) Roohollah Noori, “Wilhelm Dilthey's Hermeneutics and its Relation to Humanities,” Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 2012, Vol. 4, No 11, p. 155.

반면에 지역연구는 종속변수가 놓여진 사회적 맥락을 중요시한다. 맥락은 변수들로 엮어진 하나의 실타래와 같다. 과학의 목표가 얹혀있는 실타래를 풀어서 각각의 실이 갖는 영향력을 알아내는 것이라면, 맥락연구는 실의 역할을 한 올씩 규명하려는 것이 아니라, 실타래의 속성을 밝히려는 것이다. 사회적 맥락을 파악하기 위해 해석적 분석을 추구하는 지역연구는 내부자 시각, 학제적 연구, 현지지식의 활용이라는 세 가지 연구방법을 중시한다.

첫째, 지역학이 강조하는 내부자 시각은 오리엔탈리즘의 반대이다. 즉 지역학은 해외지역 사람의 사고방식과 행위양식을 연구의 중심에 두어야 한다. 이러한 시각은 문화적 상대주의와 통한다. 모든 문화는 해당 지역에서 역사적으로 형성 발전되면서 독자성을 갖게 되고, 그 결과 해당 사회의 작동원리로 작용하는 규범적 힘을 가지게 된다. 따라서 개별 국가의 특수한 현상에 대해서는 내부자의 시각에서 이해하고 분석하여야 한다는 것이다.

둘째, 학제적 연구는 근대과학에 대한 학문적 반란이다. 우리가 살고 있는 세상은 복잡하게 연결되어 있는데, 학문 영역은 전문화, 세분화, 파편화되었다. 학제적 접근법은 분과학문의 칸막이를 뛰어 넘으려는 노력이다. 오늘날 통섭이라는 이름하에 인문학과 자연과학도 소통을 시도하는 이유가 여기에 있다. 학제적 연구는 사회현상을 쪼개지 않고, 있는 그대로 총합적으로 이해하려는 노력이다. 그러기에 지역연구는 현실과 가깝고 실용성적이다. 모든 연관된 학문을 한꺼번에 다룬다는 것은 너무 광범위한 일이다. 하지만 지역연구는 한 국가에 국한하여 다학문을 집중적으로 활용함으로써 학제적 연구의 어려움을 극복할 수 있다.

셋째, 현지 지식의 활용을 위해 지역연구는 현지어 능력에 기반한 현지 자료의 발굴과 현지 조사를 중시한다. 즉 지역연구는 토착지식(local knowledge)에 기초하여 이루어지며, 따라서 1차 자료의 수집을 중요하게 생각한다. 이러한 관점은 내부자적 시각과 연계되는 것이다. 과거에는 지역학이 비용이 많이 드는 학문이었다. 하지만 오늘날 인터넷의 발달로 인하여, 현지어 능력을 갖추고 있다면, 현지 방문을 하지 않고도 많은 자료를 수집할 수 있게 되었다.

### III. 일본연구와 중국연구의 변화 발전

#### 1. 한국의 일본연구

일본지역연구에 영향을 미치는 근본요인으로서는 지리적 인접성, 문화적 유사성, 식민지 경험 등이 있다. 지리적 인접성은 빈번한 정보의 유입을 가능하게 하고, 현지조사의 비용을 저렴하게 해준다. 문화적 유사성은 지역전문가에게 필수적인 현지어의 습득을 수월하게 해준다. 그리고 동일한 문화권에 속해 있기 때문에 사전 교육이나 훈련 없이도 일본 현지의 정보와 지식을 분석하는 것이 가능하게 된다.

식민지 경험은 한국의 일본연구에 장애요인으로 작용한다. 첫째, 식민지적 억압을 받았던 세대들은 일본에 대한 반감 때문에 일본으로부터 배우겠다는 자세를 가질 수 없었다. 고등학교에서 일본어가 제2외국어로 가르치기 시작한 것은 1973년에 이르러서이다. 그리고 2009년 현재까지 서울대학교와 연세대학교의 학부에 일본관련 학과가 존재하지 않는다. 둘째, 일본에 대한 반감과 편견은 일본을 객관적으로 바라보고 평가할 수 있는 가치중립적 자세를 가지기 어렵게 한다. 가치중립이란 자신의 세계관, 종교관, 이념 등에 의해 연구의 방향이 영향을 받지 않는 것을 말한다. 따라서 일본에 대한 편견을 극복하는 것은 연구의 객관성 확보를 위해 필요한 중요한 과제이다.

물론 지역연구는 편견을 무조건 부정적으로 보지 않는다. 한국인의 일본에 대한 편견을 이해하지 못하고서 한일관계를 제대로 이해할 수 없다. 한일 FTA 협상이 역사교과서와 야스쿠니 참배문제로 중단된 것도 엄연한 현실이다. 편견이 나쁜 것은 객관적인 연구를 방해하고 왜곡할 때이며, 일본의 경제발전 모델을 악의적으로 부정적으로 평가하고 전혀 배우려고 하지 않을 때 편견은 일본연구의 장애요인이 된다.

한국에서 일본연구가 활성화된 시기는 1985년 이후이다. 활성화의 계기로는 무엇보다도 이 때 일본의 경제가 세계일류의 수준이 되면서 전 세계적으로 “일본을 배우자”라는 붐이 일어났다. 예를 들어 당시 도요타 경영방식은 세계적인 화두였다. 일본의 비약적인 경제성장은 유사한 성장모델을 추구하고 있는 한국에게 매력적인 연구대상이었다. 이러한 분위기는 학문세대의 교체시기와 맞물리면서 상승작용을 하였다. 일본에 대한 반감이 상대적으로 적은 젊은이들이 대학생이 되면서 일본에 대한 학문적 수요가 급증하였다. 그리하여 많은 대학에 일본학과가 생겨났다. 일본관련 학과명을 보면 “일어일문학과”, “일어학과”, “일본학과” 등 수업내용이 어문학 중심으로 이루어지고 있음을 알 수 있다. 따라서 균형 잡힌 일본연구를 위해서는 점진적으로 사회과학적 비중을 늘리는 개선책이 필요하다고 본다. 그리하여 어문학 중심에서 탈피하여, 일본이라는 나라 자체에 대한 다양한 연구와 교육을 하는 방향으로 변화될 필요가 있다.

일본연구에서 가장 많이 다루는 관심주제는 경제와 경영이다. 특히 일반인을 대상으로 하는 단행본에서 가장 많이 다루고 있는 분야이다. 하지만 학술지에서는 일본의 정치와 외교, 과거사 등에 관한 연구가 가장 많다. 이러한 불균형은 한국의 경제학과 경영학이 일본연구에 대한 관심이 낮기 때문에 생겨난 것이다. 2011년 3월에 발생한 후쿠시마 사태는 한국의 일본연구를 위축시키는 계기가 되었다. 쓰나미에 의한 원전의 방사능 유출 사고 소식 직후 한국의 일본어 학원의 수강생이 급감하였다는 사실을 보면 일본지역 연구가 큰 타격을 입었다는 것을 분명하게 유추할 수 있다.<sup>3)</sup>

3) 김용균, “한국에서의 일본연구 관련 연구소의 현황과 과제,” 『일본학보』 제91권, 2012, p. 98.



## 2. 한국의 중국연구

한국의 중국연구에 영향을 미친 요인은 일본의 경우처럼 지리적 인접성, 문화적 유사성 등이 있다. 이에 더하여 중국은 한국에게 가장 중요한 이웃국가가 되고 있다. 교역에서 미국을 제치고 한국의 제1교역대상국이 되었고, 또한 북한문제의 해결에서 가장 중요한 중재자이다. 따라서 중국에 대한 한국의 관심은 폭발적으로 늘어나 현재까지 지속되고 있다. 노무현 정부의 “중국전문가 5만명 양성정책”은 중국의 중요성을 잘 대변하는 사례이다.

한국에서 중국연구가 활성화된 계기는 1972년 닉슨의 중국방문과 그에 따른 남북한 화해분위기였다. 그 이전까지 중국은 한국전쟁에 개입한 적대국가였고, 사회주의 국가로서 접촉이 거의 불가능하였다. 중국에 대한 연구도 금기시되었고, 당시의 중국연구는 지역연구라기보다 공산권 국가연구의 일환으로 진행되었다.<sup>4)</sup>

물론 한국의 중국연구가 본격화된 것은 중국의 개혁개방과 1992년의 한중수교가 결정적인 계기가 되었다. 양국 간에 정식 외교관계가 수립되면서 중국에 대한 관심이 붓물 터지듯 폭발한 것이다. 그리고 수교 이후 이루어진 대중국 교역과 현지투자의 급속한 증가는 중국시장에 대한 연구의 필요성을 크게 신장하였고, 1990년대 중반 이후 전국적으로 중국학과와 중국전문대학원이 신설되었다.<sup>5)</sup>

중국연구에서 가장 많이 다루고 있는 연구주제는 경제 분야이며 그 중에서도 개혁개방이었다. 하지만 1990년대 후반에 들어서면서 주제영역이 세분화되어 양안관계, 중앙-지방 관계, 시장화, 노동문제 등에 관한 연구가 이루어졌고, 2000년부터는 농민공, 정치개혁, 위안화, 중화경제권 등에 대한 연구가 늘어나고 있다. 물론 중국연구를 위해 중요한 주제이지만 여전히 별로 다루어지지 않고 있는 것들이 있는데, 소수민족문제, 시민사회, 민주화 등은 중국 체제에 대한 깊이 있는 이해를 돕는 중요한 주제임에도 불구하고 자료의 제약과 선행연구의 부재 등으로 인하여 별다른 연구 성과가 없는 편이다.


중국연구에 대한 가장 큰 장애는 중국 통계자료의 신뢰문제이다. 중국의 공공기관과 기업의 많은 노력에 의해 이러한 문제가 과거에 비해 점차 개선되고 있지만, 중국의 자료는 국제기구나 서방의 출처 자료에 의해 보완적으로 검증되어야 할 필요가 있다. 중국연구의 장애물을 한국 내부에서 찾는다면, 중국연구자들이 중국사회에 커다란 변화를 가져올 수 있는 주요 요인이 무엇인지에 대한 관심이 결여되어 있다는 것이다. 즉 중국사회의 내부적 변화가 한국에 어떠한 영향을 줄 것인지에 관한 고민이 부족하고, 양국 간의 정치 경제적 협력 사안에 대한 관심에 집중하고 있다는 것이다.<sup>6)</sup>

## IV. 한국의 일본연구와 중국연구의 비교

한국의 일본연구와 중국연구의 현황 분석을 위한 자료는 한국연구재단의 데이터베이스를 활용하여 수집하였다. 한국연구재단은 광범위한 연구 성과, 연구자, 연구기관에 관한 자료를 축적하고 있는데, 이 글에서는 한국연구재단에 등재된 일본과 중국연구 관련 학술지와 그 학술지를 발간하는 연구기관, 관련 연구자 등의 자료를 수집하여 분석하였다. 지역연구에는 어문학과 사회과학적 성향을 가진 두 부류가 있는데, 이 글에서는 가능한 사회과학 분야의 일본연구와 중국연구 관련 자료를 수집하였다.

### 1. 연구논문의 양적 변화와 주제별 특성

지난 10년간 한국연구재단 등재학술지에 실린 일본연구와 중국연구 논문을 보면 양적으로 중국연구 논문이 일본연구논문 보다 두 배 가량 많은 것을 알 수 있다. 변화 추이를 보면 매년 연구논문의 수가 점진적으로 증가하고 있다. 이것은 학문의 발전이라는 관점에서 보면 자연스러운 일이다. 하지만 두 분야 모두 한차례의 단절현상을 보이고 있는데, 일본의 경우에는 2012-13년경이고, 중국의 경우에는 2014-15년경이다. 아마 일본은 후쿠시마 지진으로 인한 원전사고가 중요한 영향요인으로 작용하였을 것으로 생각되며, 중국의 경우에는 사드배치로 인한 양국 관계의 급속한 냉각이 중요하게 작용했을 것으로 보인다.



일본연구의 주요 주제를 보면 수집한 자료의 전반기에 해당하는 2007-12년까지는 “쌀산업 구조조정”, “일본의 사회복지”, “일본기업의 소유구조”, “일본의 공무원 제도”, “일본의 TTP정책”, “일본의 애니메이션 산업” 등 한국의 국가발전에 필요한 정책을 개발하는 데에 중요한 시사점을 주는 연구들이 눈에 띈다. 2013년 이후의 연구주제로는 “일본의 혐오표현”, “일본의 자위대”, “일본정치의 우경화”, “일본의 영토인식” 등이 나타난다. 이처럼 후쿠시마 사태이후 한국이 일본을 바라보는 인식이 다소 부


4) 김도희, “한국의 중국연구: 시각과 쟁점,” 『동아연구』 제50집, 2006, p. 56.

5) 문흥호, “한국에서의 중국연구 동향,” 『중소연구』 제50호, 1991.


6) 김도희, “한국의 중국연구: 시각과 쟁점,” 『동아연구』 제50집, 2006, p. 84.

정적으로 바뀌었다는 것을 알 수 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 지난 10년간 일본연구의 주제를 살펴보면 전반적으로 일본사회를 제대로 이해하고 분석하여 한국에 이익이 될 수 있는 시사점을 찾는 연구가 대부분을 차지하고 있다는 것을 알 수 있다.

중국연구의 경우에는 “중국의 국유기업”, “중국경제의 세계화”, “중국의 산업”, “중국의 금융정책” 등과 같은 경제적 연구주제가 압도적으로 많고, 그 이외에는 “중국의 조선족”, “중국의 대북정책”, “중국의 동남아 정책” 등이 두드러진다. 흥미로운 점은 사드배치 문제로 한중간의 관계가 급격하게 냉각되었음에도 불구하고 2016년까지 중국연구자들이 관련주제에 관한 논문을 한편도 쓰지 않았다는 것이다. 이것은 사드배치 문제가 대중언론 수준에서 감성적으로 취급되었고, 차분하고 객관적인 논의를 위한 학자들의 기여는 없었다는 것을 알 수 있다.



일본연구 주제를 한중일 관계라는 관점에서 분석해보면, 약 2/3에 달하는 논문이 일본의 국내사정에 관한 논문이다. 지난 10년간 총 352개 논문 중에서 216개 논문이 일본의 국내 정치, 경제, 사회, 문화 현상에 관하여 분석하고 있다. 그 다음으로는 한일관계 논문이 63편을 차지한다. 여기에는 과거사 주제가 가장 큰 비중을 차지하고 있다. 중일관계 논문은 23편이 되는데, 중일관계가 한국에 미치는 영향이 크기 때문에 일본연구자들이 관련 주제에 연구관심을 표명하는 것으로 생각된다. 일본연구 논문 중에서 한국과 중국 이외 국가와의 관련성을 연구한 것도 50편이 있다. 이것은 일본의 국제화 수준이 높기 때문인 것으로 해석된다.




중국연구 주제를 한중일 관계라는 관점에서 분석하면 중국 국내사정에 관한 글이 압도적인 다수를 차지하고 있다. 총 905편의 논문 중에서 657편이 중국의 정치, 경제, 사회, 문화 연구이다. 이것은 일본연구 논문들보다 더 강한 내부지향성을 보이고 있다. 한중관계 논문은 120편이며, 이 중에는 북한과의 관계가 중요한 비중을 차지하고 있는데, 북한에 대한 중국의 높은 위상 때문이라고 생각된다. 반면에 중일관계 논문은 22편으로서 매우 미미하다. 한국의 일본연구자들이 중일관계를 비교적 중시하는 반면에, 한국의 중국연구자들은 중일관계에 대한 관심이 미미하다는 것을 알 수 있다. 한국과 일본 이외의 국가들과 중국의 관계를 연구한 논문도 106편이나 되는데, 이것은 일본과 유사한 양상이다.

## 2. 연구자의 양적 특성과 소속

한국의 일본연구자와 중국연구자 중에서 한국연구재단에 지역학 전공으로 등록된 학자의 수를 보면 일본연구자가 35명, 중국연구자가 94명으로서 중국연구자가 3배가량 많은 것을 알 수 있다. 물론 연구자들 중에는 지역학으로 자신의 전공을 등록하지 않고, 중국정치 혹은 일본경제 등으로 등록한 사람들도 많다. 따라서 이 글에서 제시하는 수치는 샘플링 사례로 보아야 하며, 앞에서 본 연구논문의 양적 차이와 조응하고 있다는 점에서 표본상 아주 큰 문제는 없는 것으로 보인다. 이들 연구자들을 세대별로 비교해보면, 일본연구자의 경우 30대 연구자가 전무하다는 점이 특이하다. 아직 젊은 학문후속세대이기 때문에 수적으로 적은 것은 이해되지만, 충격적으로 적은 것은 사실이다.


30대를 제외하면 일본연구자의 수는 40대보다 50대가 더 많다는 점에서 자연스런 현상이다. 하지만 60대의 경우에는 불과 5명으로서 당시 세대에게는 일본연구를 기피하는 풍조가 있었다는 사실을 방

증하고 있다. 이에 비해 중국연구자들은 40대와 50대가 동일한 33명을 기록하고 있는데, 이것은 중국에 대한 열풍이 오랫동안 지속되고 있음을 보여주고 있다. 또한 60대의 경우에도 일본연구자에 비해서는 양적으로 많은 수치를 보인다.



일본연구자와 중국연구자를 연령별로 각각 비교하면, 30대의 경우에는 일본연구에 비해 중국연구에서는 학문후속세대가 두텁게 존재하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 이 세대를 제외하면 40대에서 일본연구자와 중국연구자들이 수적으로 가장 압도적인 차이가 있음을 알 수 있다. 이러한 사실은 중국연구는 지속성을 가지는 반면에 일본연구의 경우에는 연구자의 수에서 쇠퇴하고 있음을 보여주고 있는 것이다. 이러한 차이는 50대에서는 별로 나타나지 않지만, 60대에서 두드러진다는 것을 알 수 있다. 60대의 경우에 나타나는 연구자 수의 차이는 앞에서 언급한 바와 같이 식민지적 유산이다.

이들 연구자들을 직업별로 분류해보면, 일본과 중국연구자들을 대다수 포용하고 있는 연구기관은 대학이라는 것을 알 수 있다. 일본연구자의 경우에는 24명, 중국연구자는 66명이 대학에 소속하고 있다. 따라서 지역별 연구와 연구자의 소속 간에는 차별성이 보이지 않는다. 그런데 연구소 근무자의 수가 적은 것은 지역연구자가 정책연구소에 적합하지 않다기보다 대학에 비해 연구소의 숫자가 절대적으로 부족하기 때문인 것으로 보인다. 왜냐하면, 지역연구자들은 일반적으로 정책연구소에서 환영하는 전공자들이기 때문이다.



### 3. 연구기관과 발간저널

한국연구재단에 등재된 일본과 중국연구 학술지와 이것을 발행하는 연구기관은 매우 다양하다. 일본과 중국을 전문적으로 연구하고 관련 학술지를 발간하는 연구기관이 있는가 하면, 포괄적인 지역연구를 하면서 일본과 중국에 관한 연구논문을 모두 발간하는 연구기관도 있다. 연구기관은 주로 학회와 연구소로 구성되는데, 학회는 연구소보다 연구 성과 발간에서는 앞서지만, 연구소는 학회보다 수적으로 많다.

일본과 중국연구에서 가장 많은 논문을 발간하는 연구기관은 한중사회과학학회, 현대중국학회, 현대일본학회가 탑3를 차지하고 있다. 한중사회과학학회는 지난 10년간 총 269편의 중국연구논문을 발간하여 타의 추종을 불허하고 있다. 현대중국학회는 141편으로 그 절반의 논문편수를 발간하였다. 현대일본학회는 129편의 일본연구논문을 발표하여 일본연구기관으로는 가장 앞선 성과를 보이고 있다.

대학연구소로는 한국외대의 국제지역연구센터, 고려대의 아세아문제연구소, 서강대 동아연구소, 서울대 일본연구소, 연세대 동서문제연구원 등이 지역연구 논문을 발간하고 있다. 이 중에서 서울대를 제외하고 모든 대학들이 일본이나 중국에 대한 특화 없이 전 지역을 망라하고 있다. 이와 같은 지역연구기관의 현황을 볼 때, 한국의 지역연구가 안고 있는 과제를 아래와 같이 정리할 수 있다.



중국/일본학 학술 저널 논문수

Ranking	학술지명(영문학술지명)	발행기관(국문)	발행기관(영문)	중국주제논문수	일본주제논문수	합계
1	한중사회과학연구 (Korean-Chinese Social Science Studies)	한중사회과학학회	Korea-China Social Science Association	269	7	276
2	현대중국연구 (The Journal of Modern China Studies)	현대중국학회	Korean Association Of Contemporary Chinese Studies(Kaccs)	141	1	142
3	일본연구논총 (The Korean Journal for Japanese Studies)	현대일본학회	The Korean Association For Japanese Studies	3	129	132
4	Journal of China Studies	중국연구소	Institute of Chinese Studies	128	3	131
5	中國과 中國學(China and Sinology)	중국연구센터	China Research Center	103	5	108
6	국제지역연구 (Journal of International Area Studies)	국제지역연구센터	Center for International Area Studies	73	22	95
7	아세아연구 (The Journal of Asiatic Studies)	아세아문제연구소	Asiatic Research Center	34	47	81
8	동아연구	동아연구소	Sogang Institute for East Asian Studies(SIEAS)	28	20	48
9	일본비평 (Korean Journal of Japanese Studies)	일본연구소	Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University	0	35	35
10	중국지식네트워크 (China Knowledge Network)	중국인문사회연구소	Center for Interdisciplinary Research on China	27	0	27
11	동서연구	동서문제연구원	Institute of East and West Studies	15	11	26
12	만주연구(Journal of Manchurian Studies)	만주학회	The Manchurian Studies Association	11	9	20
13	지역산업연구	산업경영연구소	The Institute of business management	11	8	19
14	일본공간	일본학연구소	The Institute of Japanese Studies	2	16	18
15	지역발전연구 (Journal of Regional Studies and Development)	빈곤문제국제개발연구원	Institute for Poverty Alleviation and International Development: IPAID	4	7	11

출처: KCI

첫째, 연구분야의 특성화 및 집중화이다. 각 연구소들이 어문학, 정치, 경제, 사회, 문화 등의 학문분야 별로 주제를 세분화하여 연구하거나, 아니면 주요한 연구주제를 선정하여 장기연구를 하는 것이 필요하다. 예를 들어 일본연구의 경우에는 야스쿠니 신사, 천황, 지방축제 등에 관한 특성화 연구기관이 필요하며, 중국연구의 경우에는 일대일로, 농민공, 서부개발 등을 중점적으로 다루는 연구기관이 존재할 필요가 있다.

둘째, 연구 성과의 지속적인 축적이다. 연구 성과는 주로 학술지와 단행본을 통해 발간된다. 따라서 일본과 중국을 연구하는 지역 연구소들이 지속적으로 양질의 학술지를 발간할 수 있는 인프라를 갖추 수 있도록 장기적으로 도울 필요가 있다.

셋째, 국내외 지역전문가들의 네트워크 구축이다. 예를 들어 일본학연구소 연합회나 중국학연구소연합회 등을 설립하여 통합 웹사이트를 운용할 필요가 있다. 대학연구소는 각 대학 웹사이트에서 여러 단계를 거쳐야 접속이 가능한 경우가 많은데, 연합회 웹사이트를 활용하면 통합적이면서 빠른 접근성을 확보할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 학회와 대학연구소 간의 협력체계를 구축할 필요가 있다. 학회의 장점인 전통과 재정력을 대학연구소의 장점인 특성화와 결집력에 결합하여 시너지 효과를 살릴 수 있을 것이다. 또한 각 연구소가 발간하는 저널의 투고양식을 통일함으로써 투고자의 편의성을 증대시키는 것이 연구 성과의 신속한 축적에 도움이 될 것이다.<sup>7)</sup>

넷째, 연구기관의 문호를 개방하여, 일반시민들을 대상으로 지역학 시민강좌를 개설할 필요가 있다. 또한 현지탐방 단체 프로그램을 개발하거나 교양총서를 간행하는 것을 추진할 필요가 있다.

7) 김용균, “한국에서의 일본연구 관련 연구소의 현황과 과제,” 『일본학보』 제1권, 2012, p. 105.

발표2

# Japan's New Approach to Southeast Asia

| Keio University, Tokyo **Ken Jimbo** 교수 |

# Japan's New Approach to Southeast Asia

Keio University, Tokyo

Ken Jimbo 교수

## Introduction

Japan's strategic engagement in Southeast Asia, since its inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has been driven by strong commercial interests. With Japan's large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI) accumulated over past decades, ASEAN became the hub of production networks of Japanese firms and their joint ventures in Asia. As early as in August 1977, then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda articulated a bench mark speech in Manila, known as the Fukuda Doctrine<sup>1)</sup>. While Japan cautiously rejected the role of a military power, it was resolved to peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia through supporting ASEAN's solidarity and resilience. For long years, Japan avoided the direct military role in the region while becoming the number one donor of the Official Development Assistance (ODA)<sup>2)</sup>. These principles laid foundation for subsequent Prime Ministers, irrespective of their ideological affiliations, to embrace the diplomatic templates of the Fukuda Doctrine<sup>3)</sup>.

Throughout decades of post-WWII security environment, Japan's 'indirect' security role in Southeast Asia has been to provide the platform of U.S. Pacific-Command's forward presence in Western Pacific through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Nevertheless, the geographical coverage of the Article 6 of the Treaty "maintenance of international peace and security in the *Far East*" was confined to the "north of Philippines and surrounding Japan" as defined in 1960. The U.S. security engagement in Asia constituted by sets of bilateral arrangements with Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand,

Australia and New Zealand, formed distinct but as-a-whole provided favorable balance of power in Southeast Asia.

Japan's direct security presence in Southeast Asia began with non-traditional security realm. The most significant first step was the Japan's participation in the UN peacekeeping in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-93 including Self-Defense Force (SDF) engineering units. In May 1998, in response to the anti-government demonstration in Jakarta, Japanese government sent Air SDF aircraft to Singapore for the evacuation of Japanese citizens. In 2002, JSDF also participated in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor (UNTAET) by sending 680 Ground SDF personnel. Non-traditional security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN has also expanded in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), anti-piracy, combating transnational organized crimes, and series of exchanges among high-level officials.

The strategic landscape of 21st Century, however, brought about opportunities and challenges for Japan to reassess its engagement in Southeast Asia. The main thrust of change was driven by the rise of China and changing strategic balance between the U.S. and China in East Asia<sup>4)</sup>. The modernization of China's air and naval power and of its missile forces are heightening China's anti-access capability with regard to areas where China's core interests are involved while also heightening its area denial capability in theaters where U.S. forward-deployed forces had previously boasted uncontested supremacy. The change of balance of power affected perceptions of Japan and ASEAN member states about the hierarchical structure in Asian geopolitics, which led reorientation of state behavior of balancing, hedging and accommodation<sup>5), 6)</sup>.

In the maritime domain, China's advancement of its influence in both East and South China Sea led Japan's reorientation of security priorities. Hence, for example, Japan's traditional focus on counter-piracy and sea-lane safety for merchant vessels, main tool of non-traditional maritime security cooperation, has increasingly viewed from the

4) Japan's National Security Strategy adopted in December 2013 highlighted "shift in the balance of power" as main security challenge of Japan. See Cabinet Secretariat, National Security Strategy (December 17, 2013) < <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf> >

5) Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states' alignment behavior towards China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.25, 2016: 500-514.

6) \* I will further review past works including Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, "ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Political-Security Pillar"; Tang Siew Mun, "ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation: Overcoming History and Charting New Possibilities" Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya eds., *Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia*, Japan Center for International Exchange (2015)

1) "Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo's Doctrine Speech" text available in "Appendix 1: Fukuda Doctrine" Lam Peng Er ed., *Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia*, London and New York: Routledge, 2013: 158-162.

2) Lam Peng Er, "The Fukuda Doctrine: Origins, Ideas and Praxis", Lam Peng Er ed., *Ibid.*: 11-14

3) Surin Pitsuwan, "Fukuda Doctrine: Impact and Implications on Japan-ASEAN Relations", Lam Peng Er ed., *Ibid.*: 163-172

balance-of-power paradigm, that lead to the competition of coast guards and navies between China and its neighboring states<sup>7)</sup>. Thus, preserving the stability of two vital seas for Japan's sea-lanes of communications—the South China Sea and East China Sea—has become increasingly important policy agenda. Japan emphasizes significant commercial and security interests in the South China Sea, as well as in how the rules and mechanisms for maritime security are consolidated. In a same vein, ASEAN obviously needs to generate a favorable balance of power that requires equally rapid capacity building of its own. From the Japanese perspective, ASEAN's own strength and resilience against China's growing maritime pressure is an important vanguard for denying China's creeping expansion to the contested territorial waters. Such resilience would also sustain the status-quo that creates better conditions for ASEAN's diplomatic negotiations vis-à-vis Beijing. These logics led to define the Japan-ASEAN as strategy/security-driven relations.

This article tries to characterize Japan's evolving security engagements in Southeast Asia in three dimensions: security networking, capacity building and institutional developments.

## Security Networking


### a) Joint Exercises

Japan is diversifying Japan's strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. For example, Japan is more actively engaging in the joint military exercise and training in Southeast Asia. In past years, Japan has increased its profile to participate in the joint exercise, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations. The Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) has participated the U.S.-Thai Cobra Gold joint/combined exercise since 2005, and U.S.-Philippines Balitakan series for the first time in March-April 2012. In July 2011, Japan has conducted a first

joint maritime military exercise with U.S. and Australia in the South China Sea off the coast of Brunei. Japan has been an active participant for the Pacific Partnership, the dedicated humanitarian and civic assistance mission in Southeast Asia. With increased participation to multilateral joint military exercise and training, Japan is significantly increasing the networks, communications and security cooperation with regional states. Starting from this fiscal year, the Ministry of Defense will embark on an assistance program for the capacity building of security sectors in ASEAN counties in such fields as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and combating piracy. Although the current budget is rather small for now, it is expected be expanded in the longer term.

### b) Defense Diplomacy (to be added)

#### Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation



In March 2016, a JMSDF vessel made port in Malaysia for the first time in three years, and the following month the JMSDF participated in friendly training drills with the Royal Malaysian Navy. In April 2016, the JMSDF submarine Oyashio, along with JMSDF destroyers Ariake and Setogiri, made port at Subic Bay in the Philippines, the first such visit in approximately 15 years. After that, Ariake and Setogiri made port at Cam Ranh Bay in southern Vietnam for the first time. During that time, the large JMSDF destroyer Ise crossed the South China Sea for the first time to participate in an international fleet review and multilateral exercises held in Indonesia.

7) Similar arguments can be found in following articles: Ken Jimbo, "Japan Should Build ASEAN's Security Capacity", AJISS-Commentary (May 30, 2012), the document available in <[http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/201205/30-1.html](http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201205/30-1.html)> (accessed on September 25, 2017); Euan Graham, "Maritime Security and Capacity-Building: The Australia-Japan Dimension", William Tow and Tomonori Yoshizaki eds., *Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation* (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014) pp. 43-57; Corey J. Wallace, "Japan's Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (Vol.13, No.3) 2013 pp.479-517; Celine Pajon, "Japan and South China Sea: Forging Strategic Partnerships in a Divided Region", *Asie Visions 60* (Center for Asian Studies, IFRI, January 2013), the document available in <http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions60celinepajon.pdf> (accessed on January 23, 2015)



c) Formation of “Vientiane Vision” (to be added)

*The Vientiane Vision is a guiding principle for Japan’s defense cooperation with ASEAN, announced as Japan’s own initiative by Defense Minister Inada at the second ASEAN–Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Vientiane, Lao PDR on 16 November 2016. The vision for the first time shows, in a transparent manner, the full picture of the future direction of defense cooperation with the ASEAN as a whole in the priority fields.*

According to the Vientiane Vision, Japan–ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on following three areas:

1. To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
2. To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
3. To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields

## Capacity Building

The concept of maritime capacity building first appeared in the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in December 2010<sup>8)</sup>. NDPG(2010) mentioned, “Japan will also strive to establish and strengthen regional cooperation practice and support the capacity building of countries in the region” in context of maintaining the stability of Asia–Pacific region. After this statement, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) established the Capacity Building Assistance (CBA) Office under the International Policy Division in

April 2011<sup>9)</sup>. The CBA Office, launched with relatively modest budget, encompasses its operational focus in following five areas: 1) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), 2) demining, 3) military medicine, 4) maritime security, and 5) United Nations peace keeping operations<sup>10)</sup>. MOD’s initial focus on capacity building has been on modest “soft” approach focusing on the human resource development<sup>11)</sup>. In 2012, the Self Defense Force was dispatched to Cambodia and Timor–Leste and provided human resources development assistance for road building and provision of vehicle maintenance. Short-term seminars were also provided for Vietnam, Indonesia, and Mongolia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Japan has also become keen to promote maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia, in forms of “strategic use of ODA” (*Strategic Financing*). In June 2006, Japan donated three patrol boats to Indonesia through Japanese ODA. Japan took careful steps to make it an exception for the three principles of non-arms export pledge, by removing the weapon system from these vessels and by limiting their usage for anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations<sup>12)</sup>. In 2009, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) transferred high-tech equipment to the Philippine Coast Guard for use in maritime safety and security<sup>13)</sup>. Under this scheme Japan transferred equipment includes satellite communications systems, a VHF/HF radio system, a microwave communications system and transmitting and receiving equipment for various stations. Since 2002, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) receives staffs from the Japan Coast Guard for anti-piracy trainings, and as they stations regularly in the headquarter of PCG in Manila, they consult for the capacity building of wider purposes<sup>14)</sup>. In 2006, Japan helped

9) National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review*, Chapter 3 “Japan: Examining the Dynamic Defense Force” (May 2013) p.124, available in [http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2013/east-asian\\_e2013\\_03.pdf](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2013/east-asian_e2013_03.pdf) (accessed on January 23, 2015)

10) Japan Ministry of Defense, “Capacity Building Assistance” in the MoD website: [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/exc/cap\\_build.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/cap_build.html) (accessed on January 23, 2015).

11) National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review*, Chapter 3 “Japan: Examining the Dynamic Defense Force” op.cit. p.124; Tomoaki Honda, “Boeisho Jieitai niyoru Hidentoteki Anzenhosho Bunya no Noryoku Kochiku Shien” (Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force’s Capacity Building in the Non-Traditional Security), *Senryaku Kenkyu* (Strategy Studies) in Japanese, Vol.15 (2015).

12) See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Provision of Patrol Vessels to Indonesia” *Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006* (December 2006), the text available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2006/ODA2006/html/honpen/hp202040400.htm> (accessed March 16, 2015)

13) See Johan Bergenas and Richard Sabatini, “Japan Takes the Lead in Coordinating Security and Development Aid” *World Politics Review* (August 1, 2012), available at: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12220/japan-takes-the-lead-in-coordinating-security-and-development-aid> (accessed on January 23, 2015)

14) Interview to a senior staff of the Japan Coast Guard (September 8, 2014).

8) Japan Ministry of Defense, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond* (December 17, 2010), the document available at: [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d\\_act/d\\_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf)

- Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance.
- *Promoting capacity building assistance*: Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
- *Ensuring maritime security*: As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country.

Japan's capacity building in Southeast Asia, although its concept was modestly defined, will have potential to be further promoted, as the Abe administration has significantly relaxed its longstanding principles of arms export ban. On April 1, 2014, the Japanese government set out “the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” as a set of new principles on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology<sup>19)</sup>. In the new principles, the transfers of defense equipment may be permitted if the case contributes 1) to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or 2) to Japan's security. Under the new principle, Japan will be able to pursue wider range of options to transfer its defense equipment and technologies to Southeast Asia.

19) Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, the document available at: [http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e\\_000010.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010.html) (accessed on January 25, 2015)

Cambodia to improve the security facilities and equipment in main international ports. Likewise, various infrastructure projects including ports, airports, power generation stations, roads and telecommunication systems in Southeast Asia ODA recipients can be related for the security capacity building<sup>15)</sup>.

Perhaps, the most important benchmark for “strategic use of ODA” is the decision to provide 10 Japanese Coast Guard Vessels to Philippines<sup>16)</sup>. In February 2012, Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba offered the speech to specifically reiterated the connection to maritime security as following: “I intend to strategically use ODA and other appropriate schemes to address maritime issues, which are also important for national security. Specifically, I will promote measures to defend the security of sea lanes and to improve maritime security of coastal developing countries, including the provision of patrol boats to fight piracy and terrorism at sea.”<sup>17)</sup> Japan's proposal to provide 10 patrol boats to Philippine Coast Guard through Japan's ODA, has been regarded as a most visible commitment for Japan to engage in promoting the maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia.

After the landslide victory of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) at the general election in 2012, the new administration led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further raised profile of capacity building to be clearly defined in the security strategy. In Japan's first National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2013, it mentioned, “Japan will further strengthen capacity building” in the field of maritime order, outer space and cyber space<sup>18)</sup>. NSS also reiterated that utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance should contribute to the seamless assistance in security-related areas. The National Defense Program Guideline (2013) further specified the objectives of Japan's capacity building efforts as following:

15) Aforementioned article by Johan Bergenas and Richard Sabatini wisely describe the objective of these aids as following: “Significantly, none of these efforts were aimed at militarizing a country or region, nor do the initiatives seek to “securitize” aid. Instead, the programming is closely coordinated with recipient states' development needs, while seeking to respond to a more complex global environment in which sustainable development through security capacity-building is a critical component.” Johan Bergenas and Richard Sabatini, “Japan Takes the Lead in Coordinating Security and Development Aid” *op.cit.*













16) For the details of JICA loan agreement, see “Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project for the Philippine Coast Guard”, in Ex-Ante Evaluation (for Japanese ODA Loan), (December 14, 2013), the document available at: [http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our\\_work/evaluation/oda\\_loan/economic\\_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/philippines\\_131214\\_01.pdf](http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/philippines_131214_01.pdf) (accessed March 16, 2015)



17) Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba, “Japan's Efforts in the Global Agenda-Implementing ‘Full-Cast Diplomacy’ and Expanding the Frontiers of International Cooperation”, Speech Delivered at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (February 18, 2012).

18) The Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, “National Security Strategy” (Provisional Translation, English Version, December 17, 2013), the document available at: <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf> (accessed on January 26, 2015)



Recent Implementation of the Capacity Building Assistance (June 2016 – June 2017)

Country	FY	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Timor-Leste		Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief				
					Civil engineering	
Cambodia		Civil engineering				
Vietnam		Underwater medicine	Underwater medicine			Underwater medicine
		PKO				PKO
			Aviation safety	Aviation safety	Aviation safety	
			Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief			
				International aviation law		
				Aviation medicine		
Indonesia		Oceanography			Oceanography	
				International aviation law		
						International maritime law
Mongolia		Military medicine				
Myanmar				Civil engineering		
				Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief		
				Underwater medicine		
				Aviation meteorology		
						International aviation law
Papua New Guinea				Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief		
					Military music	
Philippines				Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief		
					International aviation law	
						Diesel engine maintenance
Malaysia					International aviation law	
						Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Laos					Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	
Thailand						International aviation law
						Aviation safety
Kazakhstan						Military medicine
ASEAN countries					Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	

Note:  : Japan's own projects,  : Projects implemented in cooperation with other countries providing assistance, Green letters: ASEAN member states

Note:   : Japan's own projects,   : Projects implemented in cooperation with other countries providing assistance, Green letters: ASEAN member states

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense

Regional Security Cooperation: Institutional Development

Since the inception of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, Japan has been an active and staunch supporter of regional security dialogue process. While Japan maintained the security policy centered on the Japan–U.S. security alliance, multilateral security cooperation provided supplementary platform for non–zero–sum confidence–building in the region amid post–Cold War security environment<sup>20)</sup>. Japan's confidence in the ARF, however, gradually waned since late 1990s given the slow progress and poor record in promotion of confidence building measures (CBMs) and preventive diplomacy despite projected phased approach in the ARF Concept Paper in 1996<sup>21)</sup>. In eyes of Japanese officials, a lack of full participation of defense officials and military

20) Glenn D. HOOK, "Japan and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Bilateralism, Multilateralism or Supplementalism?", *Japanstudien* 10 (1998): 159–88  
 21) Takeshi Yuzawa, *Japan's Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia–Pacific* (Routledge, 2007)

services in the ARF, had become obvious obstacle for adopting practical security cooperation measures.

Subsequently, as early as in 2002, Gen Nakatani, then Director of the Japan Defense Agency, the precursor to the Japan Defense Ministry, suggested that the ARF, predominantly the forum led by Foreign Ministry officials, should be complemented by a parallel defense forum. Nakatani suggested that newly established Shangri–la Dialogue, a non–official defense dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, as a basis for future Asian defense ministerial meeting <sup>22)</sup>. However, the proposal for the defense ministerial meeting met with a 'cool response' from ASEAN counterparts due to obvious lack of prior consultations<sup>23)</sup>.

Against this backdrop, Japan welcomed ASEAN proposal to expand the format of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) to invite "plus" members in ADMM Protocol in 2007, and the formal decision adopted in ADMM in May 2010. At the first meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM–plus), Deputy Defense Minister Jun Azumi called for "converging various security cooperation measures" among member states at ADMM–plus<sup>24)</sup>. In his speech, Azumi reiterated that 1) ASEAN should remain to be driving force of the region, 2) ADMM–plus should promote specific measures for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and 3) importance of sharing rules and values through dialogue process.

Since 2010, Japan has been active participant and supporter of ADMM–plus. Japan and Singapore served as co–chairs of the Expert Working Group (EWG) on military medicine until March 2014, and Japan proactively supported the role of military medicine especially at a time of disaster relief<sup>25)</sup>. Furthermore, at meetings of the EWG on maritime security, Japan emphasized the importance of establishing shared customary “manners” by which all countries abide, in order to avoid unintended collisions and the escalation of situations when warships and government vessels

22) Tan See Seng, " Japan and Multilateralism in Asia", in Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, eds., *Navigating Change: ASEAN–Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia and in Global Governance* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2015) pp.67–68.  
 23) *Ibid.* p.68  
 24) Jun Azumi, "Speech of Deputy Defense Minister Jun Azumi at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus" (in Japanese, October 13, 2010). [http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2010/10/12\\_speech.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2010/10/12_speech.html)  
 25) Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper 2015*. pp.270–273

approach and encounter each other at sea. In June 2013, Japan participated in the first ADMM-plus field training exercise held in Brunei Darussalam organized by the EWG on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and the EWG on military medicine. In September 2013, Japan also participated in the tabletop exercise held in Indonesia, organized by the EWG on counter terrorism, as well as the field training exercise held in Australia, organized by the EWG on maritime security. Since April 2014 Japan has been serving as a co-chair with Laos of the EWG on HA/DR<sup>26)</sup>.

### *Strengths and Opportunities of the ADMM-plus*

Japanese government places its unique importance of ADMM-plus in following features: 1) ensuring regular multilateral meetings among Defense Ministers of 18 countries (appropriate size to focus Asia-Pacific security compared to the ARF with 27 countries), 2) engaging defense officials and military services for practical cooperation including multilateral trainings and exercises, 3) having appropriate inter-governmental coordination through annual ADSOM-Plus and its WG, and 4) enhancing the future function through recommendations of EWG which covers six issue areas. Through these functions, ADMM-plus offers building-block opportunities for Japan to cultivate regional common capacity to practically deal with intra-regional security issues<sup>27)</sup>.

For Japan, ADMM-plus will offer three major strategic opportunities. First, ADMM-plus can become most prospective platform for rule-based, principled and inclusive security cooperation in Asia-Pacific. As Defense Minister Gen Nakatani mentioned in the 3rd ADMM-plus, Japan eagerly pursues rule-based international order where laws and practices of maritime and air navigation are effectively shared<sup>28)</sup>. As only official meetings among defense ministers in Asia-Pacific, Japan perceives ADMM-plus as a platform to converge various CBMs, crisis management mechanisms and various non-traditional security cooperation measures.

26) *Ibid.*

27) Ken JIMBO, "The ADMM-Plus: Anchoring Diversified Security Cooperation in a Three-Tiered Security Architecture", Sarah Teo and Bhubhindar Singh eds., *The Future of the ADMM/ADMM-Plus and Defense Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific* (Policy Report, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, February 2016)

28) Gen Nakatani, "Speech of Defense Minister Gen Nakatani at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus" (in Japanese, November 4, 2015)

Second, as Japan endorses centrality and leading role of ASEAN in ADMM-plus process, it is critically imperative to support ASEAN's strength in engaging major players in defense diplomacy. In order to ensure ADMM-plus to be stay relevant, ASEAN's ability to navigate agendas and to dispute solving function are essential. Thus, ADMM-plus offers important platform for Japan-ASEAN strategic cooperation. This is the reason why Japan's interaction with ASEAN is increasingly driven strategically through 1) military to military cooperation, 2) strategic financing and 3) capacity building<sup>29)</sup>.

Third, ADMM-plus provides an important interface of defense diplomacy with China. ADMM-plus is the only venue where defense ministers of Japan and China are expected to have constant official exchanges. At the 3<sup>rd</sup> ADMM-plus, Gen Nakatani met with Chang Wanquan, minister of defense in China, the first meeting in four years and five months. Despite Japan's concerns over South China Sea as well as her calling for freedom of navigation, which obviously triggered displeasure of Chinese government, Japan and China agreed to have a bilateral meeting and came up with an agreement on the need to set up a maritime and air communication mechanisms for crisis management<sup>30)</sup>. ADMM-plus also offers opportunities for joint trainings and table-top exercises between Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). These include ADMM-plus military medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security field training and counter-terrorism exercise.

### *Challenges and Weaknesses of ADMM-plus*

Japan's perceived challenges and weaknesses of ADMM-plus can be addressed in following three dimensions. First, current ADMM-plus is unable to reach a consensus beyond modest common denominators among member states. For example, ADMM-plus in 2015 could not deliver a joint statement over South China Sea issues facing

29) Ken Jimbo, "Japan and Southeast Asia: Three Pillars of a New Strategic Relationship", Eurasia Information Network, Tokyo Foundation (May 30, 2013) <http://www.tokyoofoundation.org/en/articles/2013/japan-and-southeast-asia>

30) Yukio Tajima, "Defense chiefs agree on quick launch of communication mechanism", *Nikkei Asian Review* (November, 5, 2015) <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Defense-chiefs-agree-on-quick-launch-of-communication-mechanism>

with China's strong opposition<sup>31)</sup> Obviously, there was a mismatch between achieving the "modest consensus" and addressing serious concerns with the appropriate terms.

Second, ASEAN's internal coordination has been too slow in formulating practical cooperation to adapt today's security environment. For example, ADMM in 2015 has agreed on a number of important security cooperation measures, including setting up hotlines (i.e. the direct communications initiative) to help defense officials communicate quickly in a crisis situation.<sup>32)</sup> There were also proposals to expand the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to be adopted in the ADMM-plus, which encompassed white shipping and similar protocol for the air<sup>33)</sup>. However, such proposals did not take shape or form in ADMM-plus 2015.

Third, ADMM-plus faces a significant under capacity in taking joint actions for practical deployment in times of crisis. For example, Malaysia's ambitious proposal, at ADMM 2015, on the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HA/DR to form a military team under the ASEAN banner for quick deployment to crisis areas has potential to cultivate ASEAN's collective capacity for military deployments. However, realizing such mechanisms would require significant capacity building, upgraded exercises and inter-operability among member states.

### Conclusion (to be elaborated)

In facing with increasingly severe security environment, Japan needs to reconfirm long-standing alliance with the United States as well as diversify security partnership in Asia-Pacific. ADMM-plus provides a significant opportunity for Japan to enhance defense diplomacy, cultivate regional capacity for dealing with non-traditional security challenges, and promote confidence building among member states. To that end, Japan expects ADMM-plus to play leading role to promote rule-based security order in Asia-Pacific. Japan's increasing investment to diversify security partners, effort

to build capacity of ASEAN, and participate in joint training and exercises will create Japan's new strategic portfolio in this region. ADMM-plus is expected to anchor Japan's diversified security cooperation efforts to be more coherent, legitimate and effective.

31) Dyer, Geoff, "Plans for US-Asian Statement Scrapped over South China Sea Spat," *Financial Times*, November 4, 2015. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0402105a-82a8-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096.html#axzz3tiOVmT5v>.

32) Parameswaran, Prashanth, "ASEAN Sets Up New Hotline Amid South China Sea Tensions," *The Diplomat*, November 4, 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/asean-sets-up-new-hotline-amid-south-china-sea-tensions/>

33) Ministry of Defence, Singapore, "Dr Ng Urges ADMM-Plus to Abide By Common Principles and Norms, and to Foster Mutual Trust," *Official Releases*, November 4, 2015. [http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press\\_room/official\\_releases/nr/2015/nov/04nov15\\_nr.html#.VmaRtk3os5s](http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2015/nov/04nov15_nr.html#.VmaRtk3os5s).

발표3

# Regional Cooperation in East Asia

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# Regional Cooperation in East Asia

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East Asia has been attracting much attention in mass media, academia and political circles from all around the world for many different reasons. While there are increasing uncertainties for regional cooperation, and even escalating political and military tensions among the nations in East Asia, the steady progress and great achievements have been made through the concerted efforts in order to promote economic development, maintain social stability and improve regional governance. What are the dynamics and process of regional cooperation in East Asia? This article is designed to evaluate the problems and progress of regional cooperation and then explore and explain the emerging pattern of regional cooperation in East Asia by combining pluralist and governance perspectives in political science and international studies.

## Increasing uncertainties for regional cooperation

There was no real regional cooperation in the history of East Asia until the end of the Cold War. First, there was a special tributary system in East Asia based on China's cultural supremacy, in which China had established a reciprocal partnership with some peripheral countries. After the western powers came to the Far East and forced China to open its door and sign many unequal humiliating treaties with one country after another, the old international order went to collapse in East Asia. During the era of Meiji Restoration, Japan emerged as a new imperialist power by introducing and importing western ideas, technology and institutions. Japan began to invade many Asian countries and tried to establish the so-called "Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" based on its hegemony. Even after the end of the Second World War, there was no regional cooperation because East Asia had been divided into two different

groups under the cold war structure, that is, the socialist countries such as Soviet Union, China, North Korea and Vietnam, and capitalist countries such as Japan, South Korea, and some Southeast Asian countries Only after the breakout of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 was the process of regional cooperation launched finally as collective actions to overcome the crisis. The ASEAN+3 Summit in 1997 indicated the beginning of regional cooperation.

However, many different factors have constituted obstacles to regional cooperation in East Asia during the past two decades. Especially with the rise of China and the subsequent power shift in Asia-Pacific rim, the United States has moved back to Asia and strengthened its alliances with some Asian countries such as Japan and Korea. Therefore, there have been upbeat and downbeat in the trilateral relations among China, Japan and Korea. Against this backdrop, many uncertainties can be ascertained for the regional cooperation in East Asia.

## (1) Strategic competition between China and USA.

United States and China are the two largest economy of the world. GDP of both country is higher than 3rd ranked country Japan (nominal) and India (PPP) by a huge margin. Therefore, only these two are in competition to become first. United States has been at first position since long time in both terms – nominal and PPP. But, According to IMF Outlook (October–2014), China is now ahead of US on PPP basis. On exchange rate basis, United States is still at top having GDP 1.68 times more than China. By 2019, this ratio will be 1.43. The GDP in China was worth 11199.15 billion US dollars in 2016. The GDP value of China represents 18.06 percent of the world economy. During period 1980–2014, average GDP growth rate of China was 9.8%. This number is very high comparing to United States figure 2.65% during the same period. Due to vast population of China, difference between these two countries is very high in terms of per capita income. Population of china is more than 4 times higher than US's population. In nominal terms, per capita GDP of China in 2014 was \$7,572, 80th position in world. At the same time, United States was the 9th richest country of the world having GDP per capita around of \$54,678. On PPP basis, GDP per capita of China was \$12,893 in 2014.



Since China has grown fast and developed closer relations of investments and trades with many Asian countries, the strategic competition between the two big powers has reached a new high level. The United States try to hedge against China, a potential challenger to the American hegemony, based on the hub-and-spoke security system with its traditional Asia-Pacific allies such as Japan and ROK. China has been responding to this U.S. strategy with both internal and external balancing by initiating several ambitious projects, such as “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Even if Chinese leaders proposed to established a new type of big power relations aiming at avoiding the escalating of conflicts with the United States, it seemed that no substantial progress have been made during the past years. While the United States and China have agreed to adopt a positive 3-Cs principle entailing coordination, cooperation and compromise due to the deepening interdependence, the other negative 3-Cs tendency involving competition, conflict and confrontation is more likely to occur when political pressure on domestic policy-makers constrains their ability to compromise on some key and sensitive issues, sometimes leading to zero-sum thinking in Sino-US relations.<sup>1)</sup>

## (2) Recurrent conflicts over the territorial and historical issues.

The territorial and historical disputes between China, Japan and Korea have sown the seeds of mistrust and misunderstanding in the trilateral relations, and posed serious challenge for regional cooperation in East Asia. For example, the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue has been an important problem for more than one century, but it has not developed into a hotspot in Sino-Japanese relations since the two countries realized the normalization of their relations during the early 1970s. This is because the leaders from the two countries including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kakuei Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, placed great emphasis on the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations and made wise decision to shelve the disputes in order to pave the way for the normalization of their relations. If the territorial disputes are very sensitive and difficult to resolve for the time being, it is better for them to be postponed for the wiser

future generations. This is the so-called “tacit consensus” on the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes between China and Japan. This way of dealing with the territorial disputes by Chinese and Japanese leaders put the bilateral relations on the normal track and benefited greatly the two countries in term of the increasingly interdependent trade and cultural relations. Unfortunately, the new generations of Japanese leaders did not recognize the existence of the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes and abandoned the “tacit consensus” reached among the old generations of Chinese and Japanese leaders. They tried to consolidate Japanese control of the uninhabited islands and made repeatedly provocative actions against China for the past decade. The latest case was Japanese government’s decision to “nationalize” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands regardless of Chinese government’s strong protests. The Japanese government’s decision to purchase and nationalize the Diaoyu/Senkaku island in September 2012 triggered a series of drastic and dramatic responses from China. Not only there were huge anti-Japan protests and demonstrations in many cities across China, but also various administrative, legal and military measures have been taken against Japan’s provocations. Beijing has repeatedly sent ships and planes to the disputed waters in East China Sea in order to demonstrate its sovereignty over the island and strengthen its position. As a result, Sino-Japan relations have been plunged into the most serious crisis since the two countries normalized their ties during the early 1970s.

There are also historical disputes among China, Japan and Korea. In January 2014, a museum in memory of An Jung-geun was opened at the Harbin railway station in northeast China based on the consensus reached by Chinese president Xi Jinping and Korean president Park. In 1910, a Korean independence activist named An Jung-geun assassinated Ito Hirobumi, the Japanese prime minister, at the railway station in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, China. Japan condemned An as a terrorist, but China and Korea praised him as a patriotic hero. As Kent Calder and Min Ye pointed out, if China, Japan and Korea cannot resolve their differences, vicious cycles of political-military rivalry that threaten global stability may be unleashed, and the future of this Northeast Asian triangle will be a major critical uncertainty for the region and the world.<sup>2)</sup>

1) Quansheng Zhao, “China, the US, and the Transition of Power——A Dual Leadership Structure in the Asia-Pacific”, in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Chen, ed., *Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cure*, Routledge 2015, pp. 45–67.

2) Kent Calder and Min Ye, *The Making of Northeast Asia*, Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 6–7.

### (3) Security crisis on North Korean nuclear program

North Korea has been a hotspot in term of security since the end of the cold war, and made great progress in its nuclear program during the past years. This new developments have aggravated the security crisis in Northeast Asia and put Korean peninsula on the brink of a new war. On February 7, 2016, a month after the alleged hydrogen bomb test, North Korea claimed to have put a satellite into orbit around the Earth. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had warned the North not to launch the rocket, and if it did and the rocket violated Japanese territory, it would be shot down. Nevertheless, North Korea launched the rocket anyway, claiming the satellite was purely intended for peaceful, scientific purposes. Several nations, including the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have criticized the launch, and despite North Korean claims that the rocket was for peaceful purposes, it has been heavily criticized as an attempt to perform an ICBM test under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch. China also criticized the launch, however urged "the relevant parties" to "refrain from taking actions that may further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula. A fifth nuclear test occurred on September 9, 2016. This test yield is considered the highest among all five tests thus far, surpassing its previous record in 2013. The United Nations and many other nations have responded to North Korea's ongoing missile and nuclear development with a variety of sanctions. On March 2, 2016, the UN Security Council voted to impose additional sanctions against North Korea. In 2017, North Korea test-launched two ICBMs, the second of which had sufficient range to reach the continental United States. In September 2017, the country announced a further "perfect" hydrogen bomb test.

### (4) Resurging nationalism

Politicians capitalize on extreme nationalism in the three countries in order to consolidate their political legitimacy and the public receive the patriotic education for the higher level of national pride. This has driven the East Asian leaders to take uncompromisable attitudes and positions on many important issues.

In China, it manifested under Xi Jinping's presidency as a revitalization of the Great Chinese Nation, chasing the long-term project of the "China Dream", with a more assertive foreign policy and a great centralization of the power in the hands of the

leader. Based on his "tigers and flies campaign", and his choice not to nominate a successor, the Chinese leader headed towards a decidedly more authoritarian dimension. With a strong grip on a newly popular CCP, and thus on the country as a whole, and an upgraded military prowess to propel China forward, the leader guides his people to the restoration of the past grandeur mutilated by the Western world, and Japan. For example, in February 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China's top legislature, designated December 13 as the "National Memorial Day for Nanjing Massacre". After Japan started a full-scale invasion of China on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops captured Nanjing, then China's capital on December 13, 1937, and perpetrated a 40-odd-day slaughter. About 300000 civilians and unarmed Chinese soldiers were brutally murdered. Over 20000 women were raped. Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the state memorial ceremony on December 13, 2017 to mark the 80th anniversary of Nanjing Massacre.

In Japan, on the other hand, this process has developed with similar, yet different characteristics. The election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with the revision of the constitution that he brings on in order to restore the Japanese military capabilities, certainly reflected a nationalist shift in the direction of a more stable and lasting leadership, in contrast with the previous several Prime Ministers, who only lasted one year each. In the shadow of this centred premiership, the parallel rise of the right-wing parties, also begs some attention. Reminiscent of the US President's xenophobic rhetoric, the right-wing parties successfully lobbied for a revision of the narrative in high school history books, and encourages more frequent visits to the controversial Yakusuni Shrine. While the differences between this political phenomenon and Xi Jinping's agenda are multiple, some similarities cannot be ignored. The ultra-nationalist parties in Japan pushes for the restoration of glories past, promoting a political system with the Emperor on top, glorifying the Meiji-era Japan. Both the countries are of Confucian descent, have historically developed away from a traditionally Confucian cultural setting – one towards a Communist ideology, the other one towards a Democratic one, neither of which is native of the Confucian world – and are now gazing with longing at the past grandeur after suffering "emasculatation" at the hands of the West. Even their reliance on a great leader can be traced back to the Confucian origin: the exaggerated ideal of the great man as leader is an amplification of the Confucian model of father as ultimate authority within the family. Nevertheless,

there are differences, as the two countries took different paths of development over time: Japan allows for a much stronger contestation of the leader's authority than China, in which the value of harmony makes it compulsory for protest to go through the correct institutional channels.

### Steady Progress of Regional Cooperation

Although many different obstacles exist in the way towards the regional cooperation in East Asia, great achievements have been made during the past two decades. The East Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 drove the leaders to participate in the informal meeting that indicated the real beginning of regional cooperation in East Asia. After the crisis broke out, there were widespread and shared recognition among the region for the necessity of the regional cooperation in order to promote the development of regionalization and share the experiences of overcoming the financial crisis.

In the very beginning, there were several different proposal for the regional cooperation. One was the so-called Hashimoto Proposal “ASEAN–Japan” Summit, proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and backed up by Japanese government. Another one was the so-called ASEAN Counter–Proposal “ASEAN+3 Summit”, put forward by ASEAN who tried to encourage China, Japan and Korea to join in the process of regional cooperation. During the early period of regional cooperation, the leaders from East Asian countries discussed many issues of common interest and urgent matters, focusing on Asian crisis management, especially in the financial sector. One of the most important achievements was Chaing Mai Initiative. At the same time, the leaders tried to provide a long-term vision for the future cooperation and issued Joint Declaration of East Asian Cooperation based on the discussions and consultations. From then on, many kinds of functional cooperation have been promoted and various cooperation mechanism have been created at different areas, such as ASEAN + 3 Summit, ASEAN + 1 Summit, East Asian Summit, China–Japan–Korea Summit, and the ministerial meetings, high-level government official meetings etc.

In the process of regional cooperation in East Asia, the trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and Korea has entered a new era along with the turn of century. The

three leaders from China, Japan and Korea discussed trilateral cooperation first through the informal meeting on the ASEAN+ 3 Summit. In November 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Korean President Kim Daejeong, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo held a breakfast meeting during the ASEAN + 3 Summit in Philippines, launching the trilateral cooperation between China, Japan and Korea. In 2000, the leaders from three countries decided to hold regular meeting during the ASEAN + 3 Summit. In 2002, the leaders from three countries decided to upgrade the breakfast meeting to the formal meeting during the ASEAN + 3 Summit, and then decided to hold the Summit in 2008 separately from the ASEAN+3 Summit. In December 2008, the three leaders from China, Japan and Korea held an independent summit outside of the ASEAN + 3 Summit, and decided to promote the partnership and cooperation among the three countries. It was decided that the CJK Summit would be held every year by rotation. Upon the agreement signed and ratified by each of the three governments, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was officially inaugurated in Seoul, September 2011. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) is an international organization established with a vision to promote peace and common prosperity among China, Japan, and Korea. On the basis of equal participation, each government shares 1/3 of total operational budget.

In November 2015, Chinese Premier Li, Korean President Park and Japanese Prime Minister Abe held the Sixth Summit after it was suspended three years ago because of the worsening bilateral relations between China and Japan. The 6th Trilateral Summit (Seoul, ROK) assessed trilateral cooperation and decided the future directions. Based on the comprehensive discussions about the regional and international issues such as the regional cooperation in East Asia, international economy, climate change, sustainable development, health security and other issues, the Summit issued the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia. The steady progress of regional cooperation in East Asia can be outlined as follows.

Politically, more than 50 consultation mechanisms between China, Japan and Korea's governments, including about 20 ministerial meetings, have been established. First, there is summit participated by the leaders from three countries, in which the fundamental principles and basic directions in regional cooperation have been decided. Second, there are ministerial meetings attended by the ministers in charge

of many different affairs such foreign, financial, agricultural, trade and investment, environmental issues. There are all kinds of cooperation mechanisms in different fields. Recently, great progress has been made towards crisis management mechanism among three countries.

Economically, there are closer trade and investment relations among three countries in Northeast Asia. China, Japan and Korea have become most important trade partners and top export markets with each other. For example, the total trade volume between China and Japan was more than 300 billion US dollars, a huge number in the history of trade. China–Japan trade reached 21.2% of Japan’s total volume of foreign trade. During the 20 years from 1992 to 2012, the trade volume between China and Korea had increased 34 times, from 6.4 billion US dollars to 215.1 US dollars. After China, Japan and Korea have concluded investment agreement, the three countries started negotiations on free trade agreement among China, Japan and Korea several years ago. In November 2015, the three leaders made commitment to speed up the process of negotiation on China–Japan–Korea Summit. In January 2016, the new round of negotiation on CJK FTA was resumed in Tokyo.

Socio–culturally, the educational exchange and cultural cooperation thrive in spite of some political disputes. Since the trilateral cooperation has been promoted, there are more and more people moving among three countries. During the 20 years from 1992 to 2012, the number of visitors traveling between China and Korea increased 53 times, from 130 thousands to 6.91 million. In 2014, this number reached 10.3 million. In the same time, the number of visitors traveling between China and Japan was 5.13 million, and the number between Japan and Korea was 5.04 million. After the number of visitors among three countries decreased temporarily, there are more people traveling between China and Japan, China and Korea. According to the latest report by Japanese government, there were 5.56 million Chinese people traveling from mainland China to Japan until November 4, 2017.

The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) has been playing an important role in promoting and strengthening educational and cultural cooperation. For example, it organized the International Forum for the Trilateral Cooperation (IFTC) 2016 and the 1st Trilateral Forum on Public Diplomacy on April 29, 2016 at Diaoyutai State House

in Beijing, China, in collaboration with China Public Diplomacy Association, bringing many scholars and experts together for intensive and comprehensive discussions about the present and future developments of regional cooperation in East Asia.

There are many educational exchange and cooperation programs among three countries, among which some are governmental projects and some others are non–governmental projects. As the non–governmental projects, there is long–distance teaching project among three countries by Fudan–Yonsei–Keio universities. Also, there is Youth Leadership Forum organized by Fudan–Yonsei–Keio–Rikkyo universities. As the governmental projects, the CAMPUS Asia projects are very famous and important.

CAMPUS Asia, stands for Collective Action of Mobility Program of University Students in Asia, is an educational exchange initiative launched by Chinese, Japanese and Korean governments and implemented by the higher education institutions in three countries. It is an important program for trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and Korea. In November 2011, 10 pilot programs of CAMPUS Asia were selected and announced to the public by the education authorities of China, Japan and Korea. For example: (1) Peking University–The University of Tokyo–Seoul National University cooperate on the Dual Degree Masters’ Program “International and Public Policy Studies”. (2) Fudan University–Kobe University–Korea University cooperate on the program “Careers on Risk Management Experts in East Asia

In January 2016, CAMPUS Asia Program was considered favorably and adopted as the formal program for University exchange and cooperation at the First Meeting of Education Ministers from the three countries. Meanwhile, CAMPUS Asia program has been expanded and 9 new program were selected. For example: (1) Peking University–The University of Tokyo– Seoul National University cooperate on the co–education program “Outstanding Leaders in East Asia”.

From the fall semester 2012 to the spring semester 2014, there were 444 students who got involved in the exchange among the higher education institutions of China, Japan and Korea. 215 students from Japanese and Korean universities were received by Chinese universities. 229 Chinese students were sent to Japanese and Korean



universities. There were 200 exchange students among Chinese, Japanese and Korean universities in the 2012–2013 academic year, and 244 exchange students in the 2013–2014 academic year.

### Pluralist Perspective on Regional Cooperation

As analyzed above, great progress towards regional cooperation has been achieved in spite of many obstacles and uncertainties in East Asia. What is the possible paradigm of the evolving regional cooperation in East Asia? Is there only intensifying competition for leadership in East Asia? Is it really impossible for the two tigers to stay in the same mountain, such as China and USA, or China and Japan? Some scholars tend to look at the situations in East Asia from the realist perspective and emphasize the negative trends in regional cooperation, and even talk about the intensifying arm races and upcoming wars in the region. The steady progress of regional cooperation leads to quite different perspective.

By combining the pluralist theory and governance perspective in political science and international studies, a pluralist perspective can be applied to explore and explain the dynamics and process of regional cooperation in East Asia. The key points are as follows.

The first is the governance perspective. With the rise of civil society and non-governmental organizations, there are more and more actors in political process. The value of the governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding the changing process of regional cooperation in East Asia. The basic ideas include: (1) The rise of regional civil society; (2) The blurring of boundaries and responsibilities; (3) The autonomous self-governing networks of actors; (4) The cooperation between government and society.<sup>3)</sup>

The second is an idea about pluralist regional order. The pluralist theory emphasizes the important role of civil society and associations. Not only is the constitutional structure focusing on the separation of powers important for good governance, but

the social structure is also a key factor to balance the state power. Along with the economic development and modernization, a pluralist social order emerges in many developed and developing countries. As Robert Dahl said, “an advanced economy and its supporting social structures automatically distribute political resources and political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups, and organizations. Among these skills and resources are knowledge, income, status, and esteem among specialized groups; skill in organizing and communicating; and access to organizations, experts, and elites.”<sup>4)</sup> Therefore, there are not only state actors, but also many non-state actors, which contribute to regional governance.

The third point is the power shift. Along with the rise of civil society and non-governmental organizations, many new actors acquire powers based on their strengths and advantages. The state is an important actor in political process, but not only actor. There are power shifts from national to supranational and from national to subnational level.

The fourth point is the form of polycentric governance. After many new actors participate in the political process and regional governance, a new paradigm of pluralist regional governance is emerging in the process of regional cooperation in East Asia. It is characterized by the different leading roles played by China, Japan and Korea, based on their comparative advantages in different fields and at different levels. There are political, security, economic, social, cultural governance in different fields. At the same time, there are regional, national, sub-national, local, and grass-roots governance at different levels. This is a new landscape for the regional governance in East Asia.

Therefore, since the beginning of regional cooperation from the late 1990s, many different patterns of regional governance are emerging in East Asia. For example, there is a progress towards leadership pluralism in which different countries and different actors play their different leading roles in regional cooperation in East Asia. There is also somewhat security pluralism in which many different security mechanisms have been established at different levels and in different fields. More importantly, cultural pluralism has laid a solid foundation for the regional cooperation

3) Gerry Stoker, “From Government to Governance”, in Bernard E. Brown, ed., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Ninth Edition), Harcourt, a division of Thomas Learning, 2000, pp. 230–231.

4) Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 76–77.



in East Asia. Although China, Japan and Korea have shared some historical and cultural traditions for a long time, it is obvious that they have developed their own nationality and identity in terms of culture. They have learned to understand, respect and appreciate their different cultures with each other.

Of course, this doesn't mean that there are no problems or challenges for regional cooperation in East Asia. On the contrary, the regional cooperation in East Asia remains at very low level especially comparing with the European Union. There is a long way to go in the future. For the evolution of pluralist regional governance in the future, the identity-forming and institutional building are important and imperative.

The cultural perspective in international studies tried to explore and explain the cultural origin and psychological foundation of regional cooperation in East Asia, and tend to see regional cooperation as a process of formation of common values and collective identity. For example, Alexander Wendt expatiated on social theory of international politics and argued that the most important structures in which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces. In the social process of international politics, states learn to construct their identities and interests in interaction, and then in cooperating states can form a collective identity based on interdependence, common fate, homogenization and self-restraint. Therefore, the emergence of collective identity is an important aspect of regional integration. Although not enough, Asian identity is emerging and has provided strong support for regional cooperation in East Asia. According to our studies, national identity and supranational identity are not mutually exclusive. The formation of collective identity do not replace national identity. In Asia Barometer and Eurobarometer, survey results indicated citizens holding strong national identity also identified themselves with supranational entity. On the contrary, citizens holding weak national identity did not tend to identify themselves with supranational entity. Although there are strong Asian identities in most of Asian countries, great disparities exist between different countries. Especially, our survey results surprisingly indicated the lowest level of collective identity in three biggest East Asian countries, namely, China, Japan and Indonesia. The weak supranational identity and strong nationalism in those countries constitute the major obstacles to the regional cooperation in East Asia. According to the survey results, the percentages of respondents who identify themselves as "Asian" are as follows: 26.4 in Japan, 88.6 in

Korea, 31 in China, 19.7 in Singapore, 5.8 in Malaysia, 9.9 in Indonesia, 81.9 in Thailand, 75.1 in Philippines (Figure 1)




Figure 1: Asian Identity based on the survey question: Do you identify yourselves as Asian?

For the future development of regional cooperation in East Asia, the identity-forming and institutional building are the most important. To enhance mutual understanding of each other through dialogues regarding peace, economy, culture, environment, and human rights in East Asia, many exchange programs should be created and expanded. Campus Asia Program is an excellent example for the educational collaboration between China, Japan and Korea to train a new generation of leaders for cooperation and peace. Meanwhile, various exchange programs between Chinese, Korean, and Japanese university students should be supported. Youth Forum on peace and development in East Asia should also be encouraged by the governments in three countries. The level of institutionalization for regional cooperation in East Asia is quite low and must be upgraded in the future. For the future institutional design, the major steps should include identifying common interests, creating common agenda, setting up norms and rules about mutual rights and obligations, institutionalizing a reciprocal relationship, and monitoring and verifying rule compliance. This is a hard task and needs stronger political will and public support.