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Religious Identity and the Democratic Peace*

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〈Abstract〉

International relations scholars have agreed that there is a strong correlation between shared democracy and interstate peace, but not on the causal relationship between these factors. In an effort to further explain what fosters peace between democracies, this study shifts the focus to the presence of a common predominant religion - in particular, Christian populations and organized groups. Using the World Religion Data, it examines the effects of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and other religions on dyadic conflict onset in the post-World War II period. The results show that the presence of a greater Christian, Protestant, or Catholic population share has negative and significant effects on the onset of (fatal) conflict, and that the pacifying effects of the Christian population share increase when the institutional constraints on political leadership are stronger. This implies that cooperation among democracies results at least partly from their shared religion and its transnational institutions.

*Key Words: democratic peace, religion, international security, transnational actors, Christianity

Ⅰ. Introduction

What prevents interstate conflict, and how can we create and expand the zone of peace in world affairs? Since the two world wars,

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International Relations(IR) scholars have been seeking to answer these questions. On one hand, realists, emphasizing the anarchical nature of international politics, argue that power distribution and changes in that distribution are the most important factor. Realists argue that a bipolar system characterized by great powers and nuclear proliferation provide a better environment in which states can maintain stability, if not peace. On the other hand, liberals shed light on institutions, economics, and politics, looking for ways in which states seek common interests or avoid asymmetric information. From this perspective, states choose cooperation as a rational option that promises security and affluence, especially in the long term.

This study proposes to shift the focus from power and institutions to religion and identity. Although realist and liberal arguments have historically dominated international security studies, recently scholars have paid more attention to religion as an important but overlooked factor in international politics, especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks(Petito & Hatzopoulos 2003; Fox & Sandler 2004). Does religion matter in interstate politics? Many now would agree, but a limited number of IR scholars have seriously attempted to explain why and how. This is mainly because mainstream IR scholars have relatively disregarded religion as a factor of international politics, assuming that states are rational and unitary actors and foreign-policy making is a secular process. But in the last several decades some IR scholars have made efforts to delve into the relationship between religion and security through theoretical discussions and data analysis(Snyder 2011; Warner & Walker 2011), as discussed in the next section.

Few would dispute that democratic states have rarely fought each other in the period since World War II. But why? This study examines whether what we call democratic peace results from the presence of a common religion, i.e., Christianity, and whether the frequently supposed relationship between democracy and peace may not be directly causal but spurious (or non-causal). This idea finds strong support from the statistical analyses of dyadic (i.e., between pairs of countries) relationships

from 1945 to 2001, which shows that having a common Christian, Protestant, or Catholic population has significant and negative effects on militarized conflict onset, that considering a common Christian population negates the common democratic peace effects, and that the pacifying effects of the shared religion seems stronger when political leaders are more institutionally constrained.

The rest of this paper is composed of four parts. First, it reviews the literature on inter-democracy peace, comparing three approaches - liberal, realist, and domestic politics - to war and democracy. Then, it develops a religious explanation of dyadic democratic peace, emphasizing transnational religious groups' influence on domestic and international politics especially in the era of globalization. Next, it reports the results of the empirical test of whether having a greater share of religious population contributes to dyadic peace, even after controlling for political regime similarity. Finally, it concludes with its main findings and future research topics.

II. Democratic Peace Theory and Its Critics

Democratic peace theory has been one of the most widely debated concepts among IR scholars in the post-Cold War period(Levy 1994; Brown et al. 1996). Based on the empirical finding that democracies do not wage war against each other, many scholars and policymakers have asserted that promoting democracy increases international security as well as human freedom. However, the idea of democracy promotion which seems ethically good as well as strategically beneficial has been criticized because dyadic peace does not guarantee systemic peace(Gleditsch & Hegre 1997; Gartzke & Weisiger 2013). More democracies in a system bring more democratic dyads as well as more mixed dyads. Given that mixed dyads are more conflict-prone than others, we may not expect a linear relationship between more democracy and systemic peace.

However, we still do not know why joint democracy brings dyadic peace.

Indeed, serious debates have centered on the effect of joint democracy on dyadic peace. Does democracy have independent and significant effects? When and how does democracy contribute to dyadic peace? In defending their democratic peace thesis, liberal scholars have suggested two distinct, but not exclusive, approaches: normative and institutional(Maoz & Russett 1993). The normative approach emphasizes that democratic leaders perceive other democracies as friends rather than as rivals or enemies(Doyle 1983). In other words, democracies respect and trust each other, creating their own Kantian world in which states can avoid war even when their interests collide. According to the institutional approach, democratic leaders are constrained by domestic rules and institutions that make them responsible for the costs of bad decisions and failed policies. This makes democratic leaders reluctant to make war and causes them to view each other as prudent in times of peace and tough in war(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Thus, they prefer negotiation rather than facing the costs and risks of large-scale conflict.

One argument refuting the liberal approach is that not all democracies are mature enough to play a prudent and trustworthy role in international politics. Even when states hold free and fair elections, they may not be truly democratic if their leaders violate the nation's constitution and basic human rights. This is why Dahl(1971) distinguished between public participation and elite competition in proposing polyarchy as an ideal regime type. In the post-World War II period, we have witnessed many cases of democratic transitions that achieved mass participation in politics but encountered trouble in establishing a smoothly functioning checks-and-balances system among domestic actors. Their leaders were often unconstrained and ruled in an arbitrary way. This phenomenon led Zakaria(2003) to insist that not all democracies are liberal and peace-loving. In their quantitative and qualitative studies, Mansfield and Snyder(2005) persuasively argue that democratizing states, especially ones transitioning from autocracy to mixed regime, show aggression in their foreign behaviors because their leaders exploit

nationalism for their political survival.

Another realist argument is that the relation between democracy and security is not causal but spurious(Rosato 2003). According to them, democracies have cooperated effectively because of their common strategic and economic interests, hence the peace among them should be called "Cold War peace" or "capitalist peace." After the end of World War II, most democracies were in the U.S. bloc that opposed the Soviet bloc. They were strategic partners fighting together rather than democratic partners sharing polities(Farber & Gowa 1995). Indeed, the United States maintained good relations with autocratic allies, including South Korea, the Philippines, Iran, and Iraq, whereas it sometimes had troubles with fellow democracies like India and France. In addition, most democracies are deeply involved in economic globalization through international trade and investment(Gartzke 2007; Mousseau 2000). Most democracies are so involved in the global economy that they have prospered from the liberal world order since the end of the two world wars. As business partners, democracies cooperate actively with each other and work together for common wealth.

This strategic-/economic-interest-based approach gives little weight to democracy's characteristics and capabilities. As discussed above, many liberal scholars provide explanations of how a political system's transparency and accountability make leaders less likely to initiate interstate conflict, and how domestic audience and opposition parties allow democratic leaders to send strong signals to each other and avoid inter-democratic conflict(Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998). But the realist view sees democratic peace as cooperation among similar regimes, supporting the idea for the zone of peace among authoritarian or socialist states(Bennett 2006; Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry 2002; Oren & Hays 1997). In other words, it insists that regime similarity, rather than common democracy, contributes to interstate cooperation because states of similar institutions often share interests and ideologies and prefer to cooperate with each other. This explanation implies that democracies can cease cooperating with each other and engage in conflict. The

discontinuation of peace among "developed socialist states" after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been a key security provider, exemplifies this point(Oren & Hays 1997).

The third argument against the liberal perspective of the democratic peace theory comes from the society-level approach. According to this view, social identities bring interstate peace. Therefore, the absence of war between democracies results not from democratic politics or common interests but from social identity or cultural similarity. This approach shifts the focus from state-level factors (i.e., regime type, economic openness) to society-level ones (i.e., ideology, identity)(Hermann & Kegley 1995). In his study on liberal war and liberal peace, for example, Owen(1994: 95) argues liberal states fight for liberal ends against illiberal ones because liberal democracies believe their fellows "reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy," supporting." Some scholars also have developed cultural peace theses, including "Confucian peace"(Kelly 2012) and Asia's benign hierarchy(Kang 2010), which emphasize how cultural norms and regional traits shape, if not determine, relations among political entities(Henderson 1998, 2009). In this regard, democratic peace may not result simply from similar political institutions but from holding similar norms such as human rights and religious freedom(Sobek, Abouharb, & Ingram 2006). However, this approach loses its explanatory power if, in reality, political leaders do not represent their society's opinion but enforce their own views in their foreign policymaking. Even in democracies, we sometimes see political leaders who make decision irrespective of public opinion when they face serious issues in foreign affairs.

The three main approaches to interpreting inter-democratic peace are summarized in Table 1. They posit democracy, strategic and economic interests, and identity, respectively, as the main cause of peace between democracies. Whereas liberals argue for a causal relation between democracy and peace, interest and identity approaches insist that the relation is spurious or non-causal. Moreover, while liberalism regards democratic regions as a special zone of peace, the other two approaches

argue that the zone of peace exists because states are bound together by a common interest or common identity, irrespective of their regime types. It should also be noted that some regard democracy as not a cause but a result of peace. They argue that international peace provides a suitable environment for democratic transitions or democracy's survival(Rasler & Thompson 2004). But many believe that this proposed reverse causality cannot fully explain the strong correlation between democracy and peace.

〈Table 1〉 Three Approaches to Inter-democratic Peace

	Democracy-based	Interest-based	Identity-based
What causes inter-democracy peace?	Common democracy: normative and institutional	Common interest: economic and strategic	Common culture and ideology
What is the relation between democracy and peace?	Causal: Democracy → Peace	Spurious/ Non-causal	Spurious/Non-causal
What should we call inter-democracy peace?	Democratic peace	Capitalist peace, Cold War peace	Liberal peace
Can we find other zones of peace?	Not likely	Likely; e.g., dictatorial peace, developed socialist peace	Likely; e.g., Confucian or Sinic peace, human rights peace

It is perhaps surprising that, amidst IR scholars' considerable efforts to explain what brings peace among democracies, serious efforts have not made fully to explain the effect of common religion on interstate peace, contributing to both the literatures of religion and politics and interstate conflict (for notable exceptions, see Henderson 1998; Horowitz 2009; Henne 2012). As discussed above, realists argue that democracies cooperate because they share strategic and economic interests; the domestic approach insists that democracies tied together by a common culture and ideology support each other. But one overlooked observation, even in the domestic approach, is that most democracies share a common dominant religion, Christianity. Is there any relationship between shared

Christianity and interstate cooperation? How can we explain the relation among religion, democracy and peace? What causal mechanism linking a common religion and democratic peace can be suggested and tested?

III. Religion and International Peace

IR scholars have focused mainly on power, interests, and institutions as main factors in their studies. However, religion has attracted increasing attention from political scientists at least since the 9/11 attacks(Philpott 2002; Snyder 2011; Shah, Stepan, & Toft 2012). In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Samuel Huntington(1996) expected that a clash of civilizations would replace the former war of ideologies. His study, relying on different religions in mapping the world as composed of nine civilizations (Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu, African, Latin American, Sinic, Buddhist, and Japanese) aroused popular attentions and critical criticisms from the West and the rest, alike(Henderson 2004; Russett, Oneal, & Cox 2000; Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002). But it was al Qaeda's surprise attacks on the U.S. which triggered systemic and rigorous studies on the effect of religion on foreign policy and world politics(Petito & Hatzopoulos 2003; Fox & Sandler 2004; Warner & Walker 2011; Brown 2016; Alexaner 2017). It was not major powers and their coalition but radical Islamic terrorist groups which posed major threat to the unipolar system leader. Many pundits and scholars also pointed out "a jump in religious vitality around the world" rather than a secularization of the globe in the post-Cold War period(Jenkins 2002; Shah & Toft 2006; Johnson 2017).

Indeed, religion affects politics by shaping individual perception, preference and behavior. Wu and Knuppe(2016), for example, found that Americans, especially those more religious, are more likely to support foreign intervention when the victims are fellow Christians. This "brother's keeper effect" shows that individuals have more favorable

feelings for their co-religionists even without any prior interaction. Johns and Davies(2012) also show that both the U.S. and British public tend to support using military force more against Islamic than against Christian countries, similar to their willingness to resort to military force against dictatorships than against democracies. Given the usual pattern of bias toward in-group members and against out-group members, it is important to understand how religion affects decision-makers' judgment, especially in times of international crises, such as William McKinley in the Spanish-American War, Woodrow Wilson in World War I, and George W. Bush in the Iraq War(Preston 2012). Individuals usually support aid and intervention for their co-religionists and oppose pressure and sanctions against them.

Not surprisingly, religious individuals do not simply act alone. They often work together as groups to shape public opinion and lobby government officials. Religious groups are deeply interested not only in domestic issues such as abortion and homosexuality but also in foreign policy issues, including international poverty, religious freedom, and AIDS(Amstutz 2014: chs. 5, 6, 7; Shin 2014). One well-known historical example is British Christians' activism against the slave trade in the nineteenth century(Kaufmann & Pape 1999); a more recent, provocative instance is U.S. Christian Zionists' support for Israel(Amstutz 2014: ch. 6; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). Indeed, there has been increasing interest in transnational religious actors and their influence on foreign policy and international politics: al-Qaeda, American Evangelical Protestants, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the Roman Catholic Church(Haynes 2009; 2001). These groups' stance on certain issues of foreign affairs can be best explained not in terms of power and interest but as reflections of belief and theology.

What should be noted is that Christian organizations have grown to become transnational and influential in international and domestic politics. Many global religion-based organizations like World Vision and Compassion International connect people across nations and borders and strengthen their sense of worldwide brotherhood(Rudolph & Piscatori

1997). Since the First Great Awakening, for example, a transatlantic evangelical network emerged to forge a common identity and advocacy stance on social issues such as slavery and independence in both the United States and Britain(Yoon 2012; O'Brien 1986; Carwardine 1978). As globalization deepens, transnational faith-based organizations have become more deeply involved in international issues, not only by directly helping people and sending aid but also by affecting foreign policies of major states(Wuthnow 2009). Although the influence of Christianity seems to have declined in Europe and the U.S., Western denominational and nondenominational organizations have continued to coordinate global Christianity's financial and organizational resources, strengthening faith-based networks among people and organizations interested in international issues like emergency relief, poverty, education, human rights, and religious freedom(Wuthnow 2009: 55-61).

In broad terms, religion matters in foreign policy not only because it creates constructivist factors (i.e., identity and idea) but because it constructs liberal factors (i.e., domestic groups and institutions)(Warner & Walker 2011). Increasingly more IR scholars, realists as well as liberals, seem to agree that states often do not what they should do but what they prefer(Moravcsik 1997). This is represented in their studies of domestic actors and institutions and their effect on international relations. For example, Mearsheimer and Walt(2007) argue that Israel lobby groups influence U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in ways that are harmful for the United States as well as for Israel; another realist Schweller(2006) points out that lack of social and elite cohesion produces under-balancing behaviors toward an external threat; Zakaria(1998) attributes the late rise of the United States as a global power to its society's strong influence on foreign relations. Which social actors contribute to, if not bring, inter-democratic peace? What effects do religious groups in and across democracies have on their countries' relation?

Accordingly, it would be worthwhile to develop and test a hypothesis linking common Christianity to interstate peace. Since the nineteenth

century, there has been an explosion of international Christian activities, movements, and organizations, based almost totally in democratic or democratizing states. If the democracies' elites and public view each other as brothers and sisters rather than competitors and enemies, they may be reluctant to support a decision for war but may instead prefer to maintain a conciliatory policy toward like-spirited states. Indeed, several previous, notable studies have examined how common religion matters in interstate conflict(Gartzke & Gleditsch 2006; Henderson 1998; Henderson & Tucker 2001). However, these studies have asked whether religious difference brings interstate conflict, but not whether religious similarity promotes interstate peace. Given that religions differ in their beliefs, histories, and transnational organizations, this study shifts the focus to which shared religion makes a (more) difference in avoiding conflict.

> *H1a: Christian dyads are less likely than others to participate in military conflict.*

The effects of Christian faith on interstate relations can be distinguished from those of democratic systems by developing the preceding hypothesis and testing it based on valid and reliable measurements of religious identity. However, one may wonder whether other shared commitment to other religions, such as Islam or Buddhism, might have a similar effect. Another factor adding complexity to the issue is the existence of multiple subgroups of each major religion (e.g. Protestantism, Catholicism, Shia Islam, Sunni Islam). There were long and fierce wars between Protestants and Catholics in European history, and today there is strong animosity and competition between Shia and Sunni Muslims. It is not easy to determine which religious group members see which groups as brothers and sisters and as competitors and enemies. Thus, I develop another hypothesis proposing that sharing the same (sub)religion in general (not only Christianity) will lead to interstate peace. We may find the pacifying effects same (sub)religion has on dyadic relation, irrespective of each religion's own doctrine and history.

H1b: Same-(sub)religion dyads are less likely than others to participate in military conflict.

One potential objection to this study's approach stems from the existence of strong states relative to their societies. Even if there is a strong tie between two Christian societies, their governments may firstly seek national interests rather than follow Christian groups' demands. Whereas democratic leaders are accountable to their voters, leaders of autocracies often exploit public opinion and initiate foreign policies in search of political gains. Although there is disagreement over whether only democratic leaders suffer from domestic audience costs(Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008), domestically constrained leadership is more likely to represent domestic voices in making foreign policies. In this respect, Owen(1994) insists that only through democratic institutions can liberal elites affect their state's foreign policy in favor of liberal states. In accord with this perspective, I expect Christian states to be more likely to enjoy interstate peace when they have institutionalized constraints on political leadership. The effect of constrained leadership may also hold for same-religion dyads in general. Religious individuals and groups can affect their states' foreign relations by electing and pressuring their leaders. Domestically constrained leaders cannot easily go against the attentive public's preferences and desires in foreign affairs, especially in fateful decisions to engage in risky, costly military conflicts. The causal process suggested here is illustrated in Figure 1.

H2a: Christian dyads with constrained leadership are less likely than others to participate in military conflict.
H2b: Same-religion dyads with constrained leadership are less likely than others to participate in military conflict.

[Figure 1] Causal Process



This study acknowledges that religious groups have had increasing influence on international politics as they become transnational and globalized. In other words, globalization has strengthened transnational religious identities and solidarities with rapid and massive transfer of information, goods, service and individuals across borders. This is why since the end of the Cold War many scholars and policy-makers have paid attention to transnational networks, coalitions, and movements, suggesting the fading role of states in world politics(Haynes 2001; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002). Although transnational religious groups like the Roman Catholic Church have existed for a very long time, many agree, their number and influence have increased dramatically reflecting the advancement in information and communications technology, especially since the late twentieth century(Shani 2016: 300-303). In this regard, I expect that the pacifying effects of the same religion on dyadic relation, which are hypothesized above, become stronger in more recent years when transnational Christian and/or religious activities became more widely organized enough to affect general dyadic relations in international politics.

H3a: Christian dyads are less likely than others to participate in military conflict, especially in more recent years.

H3b: Same-(sub)religion dyads are less likely than others to participate in

military conflict, especially in more recent years.

H4a: Christian dyads with constrained leadership are less likely than others to participate in military conflict, especially in more recent years.

H4b: Same-religion dyads with constrained leadership are less likely than others to participate in military conflict, especially in more recent years.

Ⅳ. Research Design

To test the above hypotheses, I examine dyads from 1945 to 2001.[1] To interpret whether sharing Christianity (or another religion) affects interstate relations, this study's unit of analysis is dyad-years. Using the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset(Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer 2004), the dependent variable is coded as 1 if a dyad participated in a fatal militarized conflict in a given year and as 0 otherwise. If there was an ongoing conflict, it is coded as missing. In addition, I use dyadic participation in a militarized conflict, fatal or non-fatal, as the dependent variable in order to see whether the hypothesized effects of common religion and domestic constraints are found in the cases of all conflicts.

For the first independent variable, I measure each state's percentage of Christians, Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Sunni, Shia, and Buddhists in the population in a given year, using the World Religion Data version 1.1(Maoz & Henderson 2013).[2] As Bove and Gokmen(2017) recently pointed out, most studies examining the effects of religious or cultural difference on interstate conflict are limited in that they measure the religion factor only with a dichotomous variable that is immutable for a dyad across time(Chiozza 2002; Henderson 1998, 2004; Henderson &

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1) Due to the limited common period covered by the main datasets, including the World Religion Data and the Militarized Interstate Disputes, this study's empirical scope remains in the post-World War II period before 2002.

2) In this study, Protestant populations represent sums of the "Protestant" and "Anglican" population in the World Religion Data.

Tucker 2001; Russett, Oneal, & Cox 2000). Because the dataset gives information for every five years, I use each state's value in a given year for its cases of the next four years. Of the two values for each religious group in the two states in a given dyad-year, I use the lower score, following the weak-link assumption that most scholars of democratic peace theory have adopted in their empirical analyses.

The second independent variable is domestic constraints on leadership. For this, I use the Polity IV dataset's score of executive constraints, ranging from 1 to 7 (1: unlimited authority; 2: intermediate category; 3: slight to moderate limitation on executive authority; 4: intermediate category; 5: substantial limitations on executive authority; 6: intermediate category; 7: executive parity or subordination)(Marshall & Jaggers 2002). Again, the lower of the two scores for domestic constraints in each dyad is used for the analysis.

To examine the true effects of the independent variables and their interaction on conflict participation, I control for the other influences of joint democracy, relative power, political similarity, economic interdependence, border, and distance. If each of the polity scores of two states in a dyad is equal to or greater than 6, the joint democracy variable is coded as 1; otherwise, it is coded as 0. Using the National Material Capability dataset's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey 1972), I calculate the variable of relative power by taking the natural log of the higher CINC score divided by the lower score in a given dyad-year. Using a dataset from Hegre, Oneal, and Russett(2010), economic interdependence is calculated by dividing bilateral trade by each state's GDP in a given year. I use a lower one of economic interdependence scores of two states in a dyad. Using the EUGene program(Bennett & Stam 2000), I also measure whether two states shared a land border and how distant their capitals are from each other. Lastly, I include the variables of peace years, the number of years without military conflict, and the square and cube of the latter variable, following Carter and Signorino's(2010) guidance for the analysis of binary time-series datasets and using Beck, Katz, and

Tucker's(1998) STATA command. The results for the variables related to peace years are omitted due to space limitations.

V. Results and Discussion

In general, the logit analyses for the dyad-years provide strong support for the hypothesis linking common Christianity with interstate peace.[3] Whereas joint democracy has significant and negative effects on interstate conflict (Model F1), as summarized in Table 2, it is insignificant in the models that incorporate Christian or Catholic population variables (Models F2 and F4). The percentages of Christian, Protestant, and Catholic population have significant and negative effects on conflict initiation. The Islam and Sunni variable has negative and insignificant effects (0.1 level, Models F5 and F6), while the variables for Shia and Buddhist population are positive and insignificant (Models F7 and F8). The control variables show the expected effects on conflict participation: the dyads with more power parity, more economic interdependence, no land border, and greater distance between capitals are less likely to participate in fatal military conflict. The scores of least likelihood, AIC and BIC indicate that the model for general Christian population (Model F2) is the best fit and the models for Catholic and Protestant populations (Models F4, F3) are second- and third-best, respectively.

[3] To conduct statistical analyses, I use STATA/IC 11.2.

〈Table 2〉 Logit Analysis of Fatal Conflicts

	DV: Fatal Conflict Onset							
	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4	Model F5	Model F6	Model F7	Model F8
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Democracy	-0.693**	-0.291	-0.569*	-0.485	-0.726**	-0.697**	-0.634*	-0.635*
	0.329	0.292	0.317	0.309	0.326	0.325	0.327	0.327
Christianity		-1.395***						
		0.339						
Protestant			-3.583*					
			1.868					
Catholic				-1.183**				
				0.54				
Islam					-0.429			
					0.266			
Sunni						-0.497		
						0.327		
Shia							0.975	
							0.599	
Buddhism								0.719
								0.443
Relative Power	-0.136*	-0.125*	-0.123*	-0.141*	-0.143**	-0.140*	-0.135*	-0.134*
	0.073	0.071	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.073	0.073
Economic Dependence	-114.658***	-95.535**	-116.186***	-114.000***	-120.764***	-118.853***	-122.487***	-120.049***
	43.774	37.34	44.642	43.005	45.644	44.89	46.574	46.399
Border	4.132***	4.033***	4.119***	4.135***	4.216***	4.177***	4.127***	4.119***
	0.333	0.32	0.328	0.325	0.34	0.339	0.334	0.338
Distance	-0.357***	-0.407***	-0.365***	-0.375***	-0.351***	-0.357***	-0.361***	-0.360***
	0.121	0.115	0.117	0.118	0.119	0.12	0.122	0.123
Constant	-4.157***	-3.538***	-4.010***	-3.925***	-4.116***	-4.099***	-4.126***	-4.135***
	0.962	0.9	0.926	0.93	0.938	0.953	0.971	0.974
N	427697	426932	426932	426932	426932	426932	426932	426932
ll	-1687.717	-1651.779	-1667.729	-1664.901	-1670.014	-1670.737	-1671.744	-1671.333
aic	3393.435	3323.559	3355.459	3349.801	3360.028	3361.474	3363.488	3362.665
bic	3492.13	3433.203	3465.103	3459.445	3469.672	3471.118	3473.132	3472.309

Note: * .10; ** .05; *** .01; Robust standard errors clustered by Dyadid; Peace years, its square, and its cube are omitted to save space.

Does the result hold for cases of all conflict onset? According to the analyses of all conflicts summarized in Table 3 in the Online Appendix,

larger Christian, Protestant, and Catholic populations still have significant negative effects on conflict participation in the 0.05 or 0.01 significance levels (Models A2, A3, A4), whereas other religion-related variables, except for the variable for Islam population, have insignificant or positive effects (Models A6, A7, A8). The joint democracy variable loses its significance across all the models, including one which exclude any religion-related variable (Model A1). All directions of the coefficients for the control variables do not change. Still, the model for general Christian population is the fittest model according to the scores of least likelihood, AIC, and BIC.

To illustrate the effects of the Christian and Protestant variables, I calculate the predicted probabilities of conflict onset between two contiguous states not sharing a democratic system with Models F2, F3 and F4 (Figure 2-a, 2-b, 2-c in the Online Appendix). Whereas an increase in the Christian, Protestant, or Catholic population share from 0.1 to 0.9 decreases the probability of conflict by 66.81 percentages (from .0235 to .0078), increases in the Protestant and Catholic population share from 0.1 to 0.9 decrease the conflict risk by 93.99 percentages (.0183 to .0011) and by 60.62 percentages (0.2226 to .0089), respectively. In other words, the variables of Christian, Protestant and Catholic population have pacifying effects in the cases of post-World War II dyad-years, even when there are no effects of joint democracy.

Next, to test hypotheses 2a and 2b, I include the interaction terms between religious population and domestic constraints and their constituent terms in the statistical models (Models F9, F10, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15). As summarized in Table 4 in the Online Appendix, of the seven interactions, only those between Christian population and domestic constraint, Catholic population and domestic constraint have significant effects at the 0.01 level (Model F9) or the 0.1 level (Model F11). As expected, the interaction between Christianity and constraint (Christian*Constraint) seems to negatively affect dyadic conflict onset, whereas its two constituent coefficients - Christian and Constraint - are insignificant or positive. Interestingly, the coefficient for domestic

constraint (Constraint) is positive only in the Christianity-related models (Models F9, F10, F11). Logit analyses for the onset of all conflict also find negative but insignificant effects for the interaction between Christian/Catholic population and domestic constraint, whereas Christian and Protestant population share - Christianity, Protestant – have significant and negative effects (Model A9, A10 and A11 in Table 5 in the Online Appendix). Another interaction - Shia*Constraint – has significantly negative effects (Model A14).

Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), I illustrate the marginal effects on the probability of conflict exerted by the two constituent terms in the interaction of Christian population and domestic constraints by using Model F9. Figure 3 in the Online Appendix shows the marginal effects of Christian population share (1% to 90%) across domestic constraints at 90% confidence intervals. According to the figure, the change in Christian population has significant negative effects only if there is "slight to moderate limitation on executive authority" or more (Constraint $\geq$ 3). Figure 4 in the Online Appendix illustrates the marginal effects of domestic constraints (1 to 7) for the range of possible Christian population shares at 90% confidence intervals. It shows that while domestic constraints have positive effects with a low Christian population share (10% or lower), they do not have pacifying effects across all the range. These graphs provide support for the hypothesis that the presence of a Christian population affects policymaking toward making peace with like-spirited states, along with weak support for the idea that democratic institutions can bring peace with fellow democracies through constraining both leaderships.

To test the effects of globalization on the relationship between common religion and interstate conflict, I include a year variable (Year) in the models and see how this affects the result. While the coefficient for year has negative effects on fatal or all conflict onset across seven models (F16, F17, F19, A16, A17, A18, A19), Christian, Protestant, and Catholic population share still hold significantly negative effects (Table 6 in the Online Appendix). Considering the inclusion of the year variable changes

neither the absolute values of the coefficients nor the scores of least-likelihood, AIC, and BIC, the relationship between religion and conflict do not change drastically in the post-World War II period before 2002.

Lastly, I conduct three robustness checks. First, I measure common religion in different ways and run the same model as used above. Following the weak-link assumption, I previously used the lower score for a certain religion's population share in a dyad. But there can be other valid and reliable measurements of common religion in a dyad(Lewer & Van den Berg 2007). Therefore, in the robustness check, I use the mean of the two scores of Christian, Protestant, or Catholic population share in a given dyad-year (Models R1, R2, R3 in Table 7 in the Online Appendix) or a product of the two (Models R4, R5, R6) and analyze the effect of these variables on dyadic fatal conflict. Across these models, Christian population share has negative effects in the 0.01 significance level, while the coefficient for joint democracy is negative but insignificant. Second, I conducted rare events logit analyses considering the rareness of this study's dependent variable(King & Zeng 2001; Models R7, R8, R9). The result also shows negative and significant effects of Christian, Protestant, and Catholic population share on dyadic participation in fatal conflict. Third, I compare the explanatory powers of joint democracy and joint Christianity (Christianity, Protestant, or Catholic) by including either one in the statistical model. As summarizing in Table 8 in the Online Appendix, the effects on fatal conflict of Christian population are negative and significant irrespective of using a lower or a mean of the religious population share values. Also, the AIC and BIC scores of the statistical models including the Christian, Protestant, or Catholic population variable are smaller than those of the models having the democracy-related variables (lower or average Polity scores in dyad-years).

VI. Conclusion

Religion matters in international politics. Since the end of the Cold War, international relations scholars have expanded their interests to non-system-level factors, including regime type, domestic unrest, risk orientation, and leaders' personality and experience. However, religion-related factors should be more carefully examined as well, as part of these efforts to diversify and add sophistication to IR theories. Since Huntington's(1996) clash of civilizations thesis and the 9/11 attacks, some have delved seriously into the effect of religion on conflict onset and duration, but only a few systematically analyze how religion similarity affects interstate cooperation and alliance politics.

This study has hypothesized that common Christianity brings peace and finds some empirical support for it. In the model including common democracy, Christian population still has pacifying effects on dyadic peace whereas joint democracy loses its significance. How can we explain this study's finding that Christianity has stronger and more significant effects than democracy? Why does having a shared Christian population matter more in dyadic conflict than other religious commonalities? This study argues IR scholars should seriously take into account religious factors to provide a more satisfactory explanation on dyadic peace among democracies, emphasizing transnational religious identities and actors and their influence on foreign policy. It also raises many questions that deserve careful examination to further our understanding of the relationship between religion and international politics.

One issue to note is that the effects of Christian, Protestant, and Catholic religiosity are not fixed across time and space. Even looking at a single variable such as Christian population share, we may see its different effects on interstate peace, in terms of direction and degree, depending on the time period or geographic area considered. Accordingly, it would be useful to examine cases of interstate relations in more recent years after the 9/11 attacks and before the two world wars when the

nuclear weapons had not yet been used, a bipolar system of international relations did not exist, transnational religious movements had not emerged, serious confrontations between Protestant and Catholic believers occurred. Although this study used the Christian and other religion's share of a country's population as its main variable, there can be more valid and reliable ways to quantifying religion by examining other state-/dyad-level factors, such as the political leader's religion, the number and influence of religious groups, and interstate religious organization and communication(Fox & Sandler 2003; Henderson 1997: 657-662).

Deeper qualitative analyses can provide more information and evidence for causal inferences linking Christianity to peace. One promising case is Anglo-U.S. relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which have attracted academic attention especially from scholars seeking to specify the conditions for peaceful power transition between great powers. Indeed, it is a puzzle why there were no serious military conflicts during and after the Civil War. While there are some answers emphasizing normative concerns and domestic procedures(Little 2007; Thompson 2007), future research needs to analyze how their religious identities affected the great power transition. Their share of Protestant population and the revival movements that took place in those countries might be one of the factors helping them to avoid a hegemonic war.

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국문요약

종교 정체성과 민주평화론

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1990년대 이후 국제정치학자들은 민주국가가 서로 전쟁을 하지 않는다는 민주평화론을 둘러싼 논쟁과 연구를 지속하고 있다. 본 연구는 국가의 종교 정체성을 통하여 민주국가 간 협력의 원인을 규명하고자 하였다. 세계종교데이터(World Religion Data)를 통하여 제2차 세계대전 이후 국가쌍 내 기독교, 이슬람, 불교 등의 종교 유사성을 살펴본 후 국가 간 분쟁의 발발을 분석하였다. 그 결과 기독교, 개신교, 가톨릭 인구의 비율이 분쟁의 발발에 부정적 영향을 미친다는 사실을 발견했으며, 이러한 경향은 민주정치 제도가 자리 잡은 경우 더욱 강하게 드러나는 것을 확인했다. 향후 민주국가 간 협력과 평화에 대한 연구는 정치제도와 경제이익 뿐 아니라 정체성과 초국가 행위자를 아우르는 풍부한 이론적 탐색을 시도해야 할 것이다.

주제어: 민주평화, 국제분쟁, 종교, 국제정치, 기독교

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